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Class Action in the Age of Twitter:
A Dispute Systems Approach
Jeremy R. McClane*
ABSTRACT
Supreme Court decisions in recent years have threatened the
availability of aggregate litigation processes, and caused schol-
ars and practitioners to wonder if the class action might soon be
a thing of the past. This article takes another perspective on
class actions' possible obsolescence, and argues that, notwith-
standing recent legal changes, class actions in their current
form are becoming outdated as technological changes under-
mine the original rationale for the modern Rule 23 class action
and the procedures through which it is executed.
While scholars and practitioners have discussed the Internet's
ability to enhance the aims of class action lawsuits, little of the
literature addresses how the Internet, social networking, and
so-called Web 2.0 are dislodging basic assumptions about the
appropriate use and conduct of class action lawsuits. Changes in
social organization mediated by technology warrant a re-exami-
nation of the bipolar view embodied by existing doctrine that the
relevant parties are either a bonded group of individual litigants
or a homogenous entity, with no room for more nuanced distinc-
tions. Aggregate litigation processes should be designed to en-
gage a greater number of distinct groups in the modern world
where individuals can accomplish what could only be done by
collectives in a previous generation, and collectives can better
accommodate individuality without sacrificing group welfare.
* Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School and Clinical Instructor, the Harvard
Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program. I would like to thank the friends and
colleagues who have provided valuable insight through comments and conversations
about the ideas in this article. In particular, I would like to thank Bob Bordone, Chad
Carr, Amy Cohen, I. Glenn Cohen, Cathy Costantino, Heather Kulp, Andrea Schnei-
der, Rory Van Loo, Michael Sinkinson, Joseph Singer, and Jean Sternlight. I would
also like to give special thanks to the staff of HNLR, who provided outstanding edito-
rial assistance and commentary. In particular, my heartfelt thanks go to Christina
Lee, Annie Wang, Andrea Spector, and Alex Civetta for their thoroughness, sharp
editorial skill and patience.
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By engaging groups at different levels, more democratic and ef-
fective mass dispute resolution can be achieved, and some of the
doctrinal challenges facing mass dispute resolution can be bet-
ter addressed. Research on dispute systems design could pro-
vide guidance for engaging different groups of disputants in
light of its focus on creating systems to provide aggregate dis-
pute resolution alternatives encompassing both group and indi-
vidual interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For several years now, members of the academy, bench, and bar
have sounded the alarm on the creeping demise of the modern class
action.' Their worries are, understandably, the result of a number of
decisions by the U.S Supreme Court as well as several lower federal
courts that would appear to seriously curtail the availability of class
actions. Most notably, the Supreme Court's decisions in AT&T Mobil-
ity LLC v. Concepcion2 and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant3 have paved the way for a rise in mandatory arbitration
where class treatment is precluded. Similarly, the Wal-Mart Stores v.
DukeS4 decision created a higher bar for class certification. This arti-
cle agrees that the class action is in danger of becoming outdated, but
1. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class
Actions: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Conception, 7 DUKE J. CONST. LAW
PUBLIC POLICY 73 (2011); Robert Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions [hereinafter
Decline], 90 WASH. U. L. REV., 1-6 (2013) (describing limitations on class certification
in the wake of recent court precedent).
2. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2012) (limiting the
availability of unconscionability challenges to class action waiver clauses in arbitra-
tion agreements); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 703-05 (2011) (explaining the
potential claim suppressing effects of the AT&T decision).
3. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
4. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); see also, Klonoff, De-
cline, supra note 1 at 1-6.
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the doctrinal limitations set out in recent court decisions are not the
only or even biggest reason for its obsolescence. Rather, dramatic
changes in the way people communicate, interact, and take action in
groups via social media, the Internet, and other networking technolo-
gies are undermining the ideas that produced the rationale for class
actions - as well as its aggregate litigation progeny - and provide
the basis for their form and structure.
Although recent legal developments have chipped away at the
use of class actions, they have faced - and survived - numerous
reforms and efforts to curtail their use since the modern Rule 23 was
drafted in 1966. There are many reasons to think it will also survive
the challenges posed in recent years.5 Evidence to date shows no sign
of class actions disappearing as dispute resolution devices. 6 And
would-be class action defendants, now given the power to preclude
class actions through pre-dispute arbitration contracts have, at least
in some cases, bowed to public pressure to continue permitting aggre-
gate litigation.7 For now, it appears that the class action and other
forms of aggregate litigation will continue to have important conse-
quences, providing deterrence for firms from engaging in wrongdoing,
prompting sweeping changes in industries, and often providing the
sole source of compensation for vast numbers of wronged
individuals.8
But, if the class action and other forms of aggregate litigation
remain in use, they will continue to present vexing problems. On the
one hand, collectivization of claims is sometimes necessary to make
5. For a discussion of the class action's resilience in the face of many near death
experiences, see Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Procedure: Aggregate Litigation and the
Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 Nw. U. L. REv. 511, 511-38 (2013). See
also Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:
A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439 (2008).
6. See Robert J. Herrington, The Numbers Game: Dukes and Concepcion, Class
Actions & Derivative Suits, AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION, (Nov. 20, 2012), http://apps.
americanbar.org/litigation/committees/classactions/articles/fall2012-1112-numbers-
game-dukes-concepcion.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
7. See, e.g., Brett Philbin, Schwab Eliminates Class-Action Waiver Requirement
for Clients, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 16, 2013 6:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/BT-CO-20130516-714723.html.
8. See Max Helveston, Promoting Justice Through Public Interest Advocacy in
Class Actions, 60 BUFF. L. REv. 749, 785-87 (2012) (describing class actions' broad
societal impacts); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation: A Positive External-
ities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REv. 709, 709-11 (2005)
[hereinafter Positive Externatlities] (describing externalities of class actions for com-
pensating plaintiffs and forcing firms to internalize the cost of wrongdoing); Richard
A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295, 303
(1996) (surveying court views about the impact of mass tort class actions for firms and
industries).
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litigation manageable, economical, and effective in achieving the
aims of the law. For instance, those with very small value claims may
never get legal assistance or recourse unless their claims can be ag-
gregated. On the other hand, aggregating individual claims runs con-
trary to the American legal system's values of individual autonomy
and due process, while raising derivative problems of process design
and legal ethics. After all, hundreds of scattered individuals whose
claims are aggregated have little hope of interacting meaningfully
with their lawyers or the court, never mind influencing the outcome
of the case. At least, that is the presumption upon which many con-
sumer class actions proceed.9
However, the idea that collective dispute resolution is inherently
at odds with individuality and autonomy is quickly becoming out-
dated. The means by which large, diffuse groups of people can partici-
pate in a collective dispute resolution are changing dramatically, and
with these changes comes a need to reexamine the assumptions em-
bedded in the class action procedure about what tradeoffs are truly
warranted for resolving disputes involving large, dispersed groups of
people. With the proliferation of high-speed social interaction, collab-
oration, and information exchange facilitated by Internet and cellular
technology, groups in a mass dispute can now provide space for indi-
viduality and heterogeneity with much greater ease than in previous
eras, and individuals can now wield the type of influence in a dispute
that was once rarely available without a court-created procedural
subsidy. To the extent that the Internet has been employed as a tool
for reaching and connecting claimants, it has largely been grafted
onto the pre-existing structure of representative litigation. But new
means of communication cast doubt on the legitimacy of those pre-
existing forms and provide avenues for addressing the due process
and autonomy problems they raise. At the same time, technological
change is raising problems of its own for aggregate dispute resolution
9. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
1939, 1939-45 (2010) (describing the dichotomy between the individual and the class
'entity" in class litigation in relation to class litigation); Robert G. Bone, Personal and
Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History ofAdjudicative Representation,
70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 218 (1990) ("The central point of continuity in representative suit
history has been the search for 'impersonal' forms of litigation - lawsuits that do not
focus on the individual at all but instead subsume litigative individuality in the ano-
nymity of an impersonal class."); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts,
30 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 805, 811 (1997) [hereinafter Conflicts] (noting in the context of
class settlement that "since these are class actions, there is of necessity no meaningful
capacity of individual plaintiffs to participate in the settlement process").
Spring 20141 217
Harvard Negotiation Law Review
which have yet to be adequately addressed. In effect, recent techno-
logical developments provoke the question: is the modem class action
procedure becoming outdated? This article offers reasons to think
that it is, and begins to explore ways in which a better designed sys-
tem could enhance individual autonomy, and address both old and
new problems with class actions and aggregate litigation writ large.
To illustrate, consider the following examples:
In December 2011, the cellular telephone provider Verizon Wire-
less announced that it would begin issuing a "convenience fee" for one
time bill payments made by telephone or the Internet.' 0 The move
sparked an enormous protest on social networking sites like Twitter
as well as other new media outlets." The huge volume of complaints
drew the attention of regulators, who issued a statement saying that
they may investigate the action under consumer protection laws.12
The day after it had announced its policy, Verizon Wireless issued a
statement that it was dropping its policy. Its major competitors,
AT&T and Sprint, issued statements saying that they would not en-
gage in similar practices.' 3
In a second example, the car manufacturer Honda proposed a
settlement in early 2012 to class members in a lawsuit involving de-
ceptive marketing practices for its hybrid Civic.14 One class member,
Heather Peters, rejected the settlement offer of $100-200 and
brought an action in small claims court where she was awarded
$9867.15 Social media and Internet-based discussion of the victory
spread awareness of the settlement, and prompted several state at-
torneys general to consider objecting to the proposed settlement.' 6
Ms. Peters created a website and posted instructions and draft docu-
ments that class members could use to file small claims action of
10. Ron Lieber & Brian X. Chen, An Uproar on the Web Over $2 Fee by Verizon,
N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/business/media/an-
uproar-on-the-web-over-2-fee-by-verizon.html.
11. See id.
12. See Greg Bensinger, UPDATE: Verizon Backs off $2 Fee Plan After User Com-
plaints, WALL ST. J., http://online.wj.com/article/BT-CO-20111230-707071.html.
13. See id.
14. See True v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. Cal
2009); see also Michael Winter, Calif Honda Owner Wins Small-Claims Suit over Gas
Mileage, USATODAY.COM (Feb. 1, 2012), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
ondeadline/post/2012/02/calif-honda-driver-wins-small-claims-suit-over-gas-mileage/
1.
15. See Winter, supra note 14.
16. See Chris Woodyard, Five States Weigh Joining Honda Gas-Mileage Class Ac-
tion, USATODAY.COM (Feb. 15, 2012), http//content.usatoday.com/communities/
driveon/post/2012/02/five-states-weigh-joining-honda-gas-mileage-class-action/1.
[Vol. 19:213218
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their own.' 7 As a result of a stream of inquiries by members of the
class, the court extended the opt-out deadline, which allowed a total
of 1708 people out of 200,000 to leave the suit. Those who opted out
were able to express their reasons for leaving, and they were hardly
homogenous: some predictably stated that they wanted to attempt to
get more money from small claims court; some began to attempt a
separate class action; others objected to the high attorneys' fees; and
still others reportedly opted out because they were happy with the
performance of the car and objected to the idea of the suit
altogether.18
These examples highlight a number of changes in the dynamics
of group disputes in light of the Internet and so-called new medial 9
technology. The first example demonstrates how groups of individu-
als can collectivize to vindicate low value grievances in ways that
were unrealistic or impossible when the modern Rule 23 was written
in 1966.20 In this way, even loosely organized groups can provide
non-legal sanctions for violating perceived societal norms, whether or
not such norms are rooted in the law. The second example illustrates
how technology-mediated communication and information dissemi-
nation can provide avenues for litigants to become informed, en-
gaged, and influential in the process, thereby enhancing their
autonomy. New communication media can also provide means to ac-
count for heterogeneity of important preferences in the class beyond
what would traditionally be possible and facilitate the creation of in-
termediate groups around those interests. At the same time, the new
media can create problems for courts trying to manage complex liti-
gation and balance the interests of vocal litigants with those of other
parties.
The changing collective action dynamics described above and
their impact on dispute resolution can be analyzed in the context of a
growing body of research referred to as "dispute systems design"
17. Heather Peters, DON'T SETTLE WITH HONDA, http://www.dontsettlewithhonda.
org (last visited Aug 4, 2012).
18. Elliot Spagat, Judge in California OKs Honda Mileage Settlement, YAHoo!
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2012), http:/Inews.yahoo.com/judge-california-oks-honda-mileage-set-
tlement-001321456.html; see also Adam Zimmerman, Flash Mob Litigation,
PRAwFsBLAWG (Jan. 3, 2012, 9:33 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2012/01/class-actions-v-flash-mob-litigation.html.
19. As used throughout this article, the term "new media" refers to technologies
for providing immediate access to content, interactive user feedback, creative partici-
pation and community formation, as well as publication, distribution and consump-
tion of media content.
20. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, advisory committee's notes 1966.
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("DSD"), gathered from experience using so-called alternative meth-
ods to resolve systemic conflicts in a variety of contexts. The word
"alternative" refers to the fact that these methods often involve less
formal processes that frequently occur outside of the courts and other
official dispute resolution forums and employ a range of processes be-
yond adjudication by a third party. The contexts in which alternative
dispute systems are used range from recurring problems arising in
organizational settings, such as persistent complaints of discrimina-
tion arising at a large company, to ad-hoc situations following dis-
pute-causing events, such as the large number of claims for
compensation following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or
the 2009 British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The goals of
so-called dispute systems are similar to those of class-wide litiga-
tion - to provide an orderly means of calculating the cost of the
harms committed, to provide deterrence and corrective justice, and to
compensate victims appropriately.
Dispute systems may seem quite different from mass litigation
procedures, but many differences disappear if one acknowledges that
modern class actions are essentially negotiated transactions con-
ducted in the framework of litigation,21 resulting in a range of settle-
ment outcomes beyond what a traditional adjudication might
produce. 22 The key difference is the identity of the main participants
in the negotiation. In contrast to large-scale litigation, which con-
ceives of the class of disputants largely in the abstract, often serves to
facilitate a deal amongst lawyers, and is mediated by a judge, the
products of DSD place paramount importance on the individuality
and autonomy of those involved on both sides of the dispute. 23 And,
while certain features of the litigation system enable a class action
"transaction" to take place, technological innovation is altering the
extent to which courts and lawyers are needed to set up and monitor
the bargaining process or act as surrogates for the claimants. Indeed,
in both the Verizon and Honda litigation examples, technology was
able to facilitate the emergence of a system that performed some of
the functions of the court.
21. William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEo. L.J.
371, 371-73 (2001) [hereinafter Transactional Model] (describing the ways in which
modem class actions bear more resemblance to financial transactions than to tradi-
tional litigation).
22. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV.
353, 366-71 (1978) (exploring the sine qua non of adjudication).
23. Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change,
2007 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 1-4 (2007).
220 [Vol. 19:213
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In the area of mass dispute resolution, DSD offers promise, but
not without challenges of its own. First, as in many "alternative" dis-
pute resolution systems where the endpoint is settlement, mass dis-
pute systems may lack the power to address far-reaching societal
problems that adjudication possesses. 24 Second, though DSD has
been effective in certain large-scale situations, the private nature of
many systems can exacerbate social inequalities as the scale of the
system increases. 25 Nonetheless, innovations in systems design, as
well as changes in communication technology, provide avenues for
dealing with larger systems in a way that can provide space for the
individuality of disputants while addressing important societal and
systemic issues better than the existing class litigation system.
If class-wide dispute resolution survives the legal currents un-
dermining it - and there are many reasons to believe that it will -
then we must address the technological currents changing mass dis-
pute resolution and supporting a challenge to its basic rationale. To
do so, legal procedure must find ways to incorporate more robust ave-
nues of participation and improve existing procedure's fit with demo-
cratic value of individual autonomy. Lawyers must find ways to
engage and counsel clients across new media. And the system must
find ways to deal with extrajudicial processes so that it can work with
court-based dispute resolution instead of undermining it. Although
the creation of a mass dispute resolution procedure permitting
greater participation would raise many challenges and questions, ex-
perience to date designing dispute systems offers guidance for imple-
mentation. A gradual but deliberate approach to incorporating new
procedures into those currently in existence would provide a means of
feasibly expanding individual participation in both litigative and ne-
gotiated parts of the process.
This paper addresses the possible future of class actions in light
of new media technology, proceeding in three parts. The first Part
describes the underlying theories about collective action and the na-
ture of groups reflected in the federal class action rules that are be-
coming increasingly obsolete. The second Part discusses changes that
technology is bringing about for group dynamics and information flow
and how those changes are relevant to mass dispute resolution gener-
ally, and class actions specifically. It also provides an argument for
why we should re-examine modern procedure in light of technological
change. The third Part of the paper discusses dispute system design
24. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
25. See generally Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the
Problem of Scale, 14 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 51 (2009).
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theory and processes and their potential to help channel technology
to improve mass dispute resolution.
II. THE INDIVIDUAL-COLLECTIVE DIcHoToMY IN CLASS
ACTION PROCEDURE
In order to understand how technology impacts class actions, and
why a systems approach would be useful in changing them, it is help-
ful to describe class action theory and the procedures that follow from
it.
Class actions encompass a range of procedures, most of which
minimize participation by individual members of the class. In the fed-
eral system, class action procedure is largely governed by Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23 sets out basic require-
ments for certifying classes and outlines specific circumstances in
which they are appropriate. The first category, often called "limited
fund" class actions, involves a number of legal claims on a single fund
or asset not large enough to satisfy all the claims. The limited nature
of the asset means that no single individual's claims can be adjudi-
cated without prejudicing every other individual with a similar legal
claim. The second category comprises class actions where injunctive
relief in sought on behalf of a class of persons suffering a violation of
the law. These actions usually arise in the context of civil rights cases
and are thought to be suitable for class treatment because the rem-
edy is indivisible and affects every member of the class. The third and
most controversial category is the class action seeking monetary
damages on behalf of a large number of individuals who suffer a com-
mon legal injury. This third type of class action, sometimes called
"damages class actions," has been the subject of tremendous contro-
versy, debate, and attempts at reform. It is also the principal focus of
the arguments in this paper, although the arguments could be ap-
plied to the other types of actions as well.
Damages class actions were created to deal with small value con-
sumer claims, on the rationale that no single claim could individually
justify legal pursuit or provide incentives for a lawyer to take the
case. 26 From the vantage point of the drafters of Rule 23, "[t]he barri-
ers to collective action - the transaction costs of organizing the dis-
persed parties affected by all manner of decisions in mass society -
26. See STEPHEN C. YEAZALL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LiTIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLAss AcTION 240 (1987) (noting that the 1966 Advisory Committee was influenced
by two specific situations when it drafted Rule 23: the plight of racial minorities seek-
ing injunctions prohibiting class-wide discrimination, particularly in the context of
school desegregation, and environmental and consumer movements advocating for
[Vol. 19:213222
Class Action in the Age of Twitter
require[d] that an organizing solution be found, and that such a solu-
tion have the force of law."2 7 It has been widely accepted that, for
most plaintiffs to vindicate a claim of small economic value, some
type of aggregation, usually in the form of a class action, is required
to incentivize suit and proffer benefits from economies of scale in
marshaling resources to pursue the suit.2 8 Damages class actions did
not remain limited to small value consumer disputes, however. In the
decades following their creation, they expanded to include securities
fraud, product liability, toxic torts, and other types of widespread le-
gal harms, often involving large recoveries for individual plaintiffs.
Throughout the first few decades of their existence, damages
class actions followed the same course as other types of litigation,
with an orderly progression of discrete steps from the filing of suit to
the resolution by settlement or adjudication. 29 In the 1990s and early
21st century, however, so-called settlement classes began to emerge.
Settlement classes involved parties to the adtion (chiefly putative
class counsel and defendants) negotiating a settlement privately and
then filing the lawsuit, requesting that the class be certified and the
settlement approved all at once. This development was aided by the
rise in enthusiasm for multidistrict litigation ("MDL") proceedings.
The MDL statute allows consolidation of lawsuits in different federal
judicial districts for the resolution of common questions. They thus
function in a manner similar to class actions, but without the stan-
dards set out in Rule 23. Attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants in
any widespread litigation could use the MDL process to consolidate
claims and broker a deal, then certify a settlement class, all with lit-
tle or no involvement from any plaintiff. A further development in
this process involved the removal of any certification process at all,
through the use of non-class aggregate settlement. Such settlements
large numbers of wronged individuals for whom the cost of suit would exceed recov-
ery). See generally Arthur H. Travers Jr. & Jonathan M. Landers, The Consumer
Class Action, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 811 (1969) (describing the class action as a proposed
remedy to consumer injury).
27. Issacharoff, Conflicts, supra note 9, at 805-46; see also Rubenstein, Positive
Externalities, supra note 8, at 709-20 (questioning the coherence of the collective ac-
tion explanation for class actions and offering a rationale based on their positive
externalities).
28. According to the Supreme Court, "'[tihe policy at the very core of the class
action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.'"
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). See also Phillips Petrol. Co v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (stating that class actions "permit the plaintiffs to pool
claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually").
29. See Mullenix, supra note 5, at 536-37.
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involve plaintiffs negotiating a resolution and agreeing by contract to
dismissal of the lawsuit on behalf of would-be class members.
Thus, what might be thought of as class actions today encompass
a range of procedural moves and devices. These different devices all
share certain features. They have developed from a court-supervised
litigation to a process of negotiating a deal.30 And, although litigation
is the impetus for the deal, the plaintiffs whose claims are truly at
stake are largely cut out of any meaningful participation or input.
Importance is placed on the issues at stake and how quickly they can
be resolved, as opposed to the individuals whose claims are being ad-
judicated. Actors outside the plaintiff group (such as the lawyer and
judge) are relied upon to invent an articulation of what the plaintiffs
want and make decisions on their behalf. Where procedure is con-
cerned with individuals, it attempts to satisfy autonomy values by
inducing fidelity of agents and ensuring uniformity of interests with
a representative party.3 The subordination of the individual auton-
omy of the plaintiffs in these processes can be seen as the natural
outgrowth of a theory of representative litigation underlying Rule 23,
accompanying assumptions about groups and large-scale participa-
tion.
A. The Class as Entity
Seeking to resolve complex systemic issues involving multiple
parties, the creators of the modern class action procedure under-
standably felt compelled to simplify the processes for achieving reso-
lution. In order to devise a workable system, they embraced a model
of large-scale litigation in which the class is treated as a homogenous
and unitary collection of rights and interests - something that
would come to be described as an "entity,"32 into which individual
plaintiffs are transformed through "judicial alchemy."33 The entity is
30. This was first recognized by William Rubenstein. For a more thorough expla-
nation of how litigation has largely become transactional, see Rubenstein, Transac-
tional Model, supra note 21, at 371-77.
31. See Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort
Class Action, 115 HARv. L. REV. 747, 756 (2001) [hereinafter Put Options].
32. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 16 (1996); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class
Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1941-46 (2010); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions:
The Class as Party and Client, 73 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 917 (1997) [hereinafter
The Class].
33. The term "alchemy," has been used to describe the conversion of individual
plaintiffs into distinct litigants. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 599 U.S. 393, 436 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court today approves
Shady Grove's attempt to transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award, although
224 [Vol. 19:213
Class Action in the Age of Twitter
a fiction, but it is easier to deal with as a participant in a complex
dispute resolution process than large numbers of individual claim-
ants. In addition to the entity model of the class, a parallel concept of
the class exists - the collection of individual claimants pulled to-
gether in a process akin to a giant joinder proceeding.34 Both con-
cepts are useful: the entity is easier and more efficient to manage,
while the joined individuals retain some of their autonomy. However,
the two concepts pull in different and sometimes inconsistent direc-
tions, giving rise to internal tension in class action doctrine.35 The
extent and form of those inconsistencies has been described else-
where and is outside the scope of this article, but the important point
is that no single conceptual model captured the idea of the class in a
way that satisfied both group and individual interests completely.
Means of trying to reconcile individual and group interests re-
flected other familiar forms of social organization that existed in 1966
and afterward. As Professor Coffee has summarized, "[firom a gov-
ernance perspective, a class action is an organization, often with
thousands of members, that persists for an indefinite period, usually
several years from the case's filing to its resolution."36 The problem
with this perspective is that existing court procedures were - and
are - more suited to dealing with parties and their representatives
than with various levels of a complex organization. Thus the class
action procedure and the aggregate litigation progeny that developed
from it treats the class "organization" as an abstract body, to be gov-
erned and handled through proxies and surrogates. Individual plain-
tiffs are largely assumed to be unable to participate in any significant
way, and unnecessary to the process.37
the State creating the right to recover has proscribed this alchemy."); see also Bone,
supra note 9, at 218.
34. See Lahav, supra note 9, at 1939-40. The conceptual division is apparent
even among members of the current Supreme Court.
35. See id. at 1943-44 (2010) (describing the different views of class actions as
entities or aggregations of individuals, and discussing the Rules' inconsistent treat-
ment of the class); cf. Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 23, at 6 (making a broader but
parallel point that "[d]ispute resolution scholarship and practice frequently assign
different approaches, and even different conflict resolution systems, to individual and
systemic problems"); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Ag-
gregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 15-24 (2009) (noting in the context of group
litigation a false dichotomy between group-oriented individuals and individuals
within the group).
36. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously,
110 COLUM. L. REv. 288, 306 (2010).
37. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Conflicts, supra note 9, at 811 (noting, in the context of
class settlement, that "since these are class actions, there is of necessity no meaning-
ful capacity of individual plaintiffs to participate in the settlement process"); see also
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B. Individual Interests by Proxy
Rule 23 sets out a representation and governance structure for
the class "organization," vesting most of the control in the traditional
actors with whom courts deal: lawyers, judges, and to a lesser extent,
the class representative, objectors, and occasionally judicial ancilla-
ries, such as special masters.38 Rule 23 tasks these parties with de-
termining the membership of the entity, developing its rights and
interests, and ensuring that it is treated fairly in the aggregate
sense. 39 The mechanisms for regulating these actors have been de-
scribed using the institutional design terms frequently used for orga-
nizational governance: "exit," "voice" and "loyalty."40 The "exit"
feature provides a rough proxy for choice by allowing members to
leave the class if they so desire. "Voice" technically encompasses the
ability of group members to wield influence through their class repre-
sentative, or by articulating their views by objection, which seldom
has much effect. "Loyalty" is a proxy for the lawyer-client relation-
ship that is presumed to exist between the collective and the agents
who represent its sole means of acting. Examining the actors and
rights that comprise class governance reveal numerous ways in
which exit, voice, and loyalty are poor substitutes for individual au-
tonomy in the class action context, and even where they might suf-
fice, existing litigation norms and procedures fail to serve them well.
1. The Judge
The most influential guardian of, and stand-in for, plaintiff inter-
ests in a class action is the judge.41 In the class action context, the
judge's role migrates from adjudicating the legal rights in question to
Samuel Issacharoff Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Ac-
tions 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1057, 1060 (2002).
38. See FED. R. Cv. P. 23.
39. See Lahav, supra note 9, at 1940-45 (descrining the class as a product of the
lawyers' imagination).
40. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
To DECLINE IN FiRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (introducing the "exit, voice,
and loyalty" typology). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Rec-
onciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370,
376-77, 419 (2000) (recommending a focus on exit opportunities to discipline class
counsel); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 366-80 (1999) (adopting the framework of exit, voice, and
loyalty in the class action setting and recommending improvements to check attorney
opportunism).
41. See generally Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation
Era, 113 Yale L.J. 27 (2003); Judith Resnik, Courts: In and out of Sight, Site, and
Cite, 53 VuL. L. REv. 771 (2008); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv.
374 (1982).
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ensuring the appropriate conditions for representation brokering set-
tlement and managing the entire trial process. This complex task is
quite different from the one a judge traditionally performs. What has
been described as "managerial judging"42 puts the judge into a cen-
tral role - or as explained below, a number of central roles - in the
litigation process, already departing significantly from the simple
task of being a neutral referee. Arguably in some cases, judges are
forced to go beyond even the structure contemplated by Rule 23 to
accomplish the task required of them. But even if a judge remains
within the explicit language of Rule 23, he or she will wield a tremen-
dous degree of control over what plaintiff interests are ultimately be
articulated.
The motion for class certification is the judge's first opportunity
to weigh in on behalf of absent litigants. In order for a class to be
certified, the conditions of Rule 23(a) must apply, roughly assuring
that class treatment is both appropriate and possible. In that respect,
the Rule requires the judge to assess numerosity,43 requiring that the
plaintiff class be so numerous as to make the bringing of individual
claims infeasible. The rule also imposes a requirement of commonal-
ity" to ensure homogeneity among the class members, so that an ag-
gregate proceeding might deal with the interests of a large number of
people as though they were uniform.45 These rules ensure the same-
ness of legal claims and the facts and circumstances surrounding
them, such that the interests of the group can be fairly represented
(at least in theory) by one or a few. 46 Moreover, for damages class
actions, 47 the explicit predominance and superiority requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3) mandate that the judge weigh whether or not common
42. Alvin K. Hellerstein, James A. Henderson Jr & Aaron Twerski, Managerial
Judging: The 9/11 Responders' Tort Litigation, SSRN ELIBRAnY (Brooklyn Law Sch.
Legal Studies Research Papers Accepted Paper Series, Paper No. 298, 2012), availa-
ble at http-//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2033944 (last visited Oct 3,
2012).
43. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(1).
44. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(2).
45. Cf. Lahav, supra note 9, at 1940-46 (describing treatment of the class as a
singular "entity").
46. To the extent that the judge perceives materially different interests among
different groups, the judge can create sub-classes. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5). This
adds to the granularity of the understanding and treatment of class interests. Such
decisions about what subgroups share common interests are similarly ultimately de-
termined by the judge, and invariably will include individuals with varying sets of
interests.
47. These are class actions seeking monetary relief under FED. R. Cv. P. 23(b)(3).
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questions predominate the action (as opposed to merely being pre-
sent) and whether aggregation is indeed the best of all possible dis-
pute resolution mechanisms for vindicating the claims at issue.48
Part of this calculus is the "the class members' interest in indepen-
dently controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions."49
Once a judge determines that the group's interests can be effec-
tively represented, he or she makes sure that those actors charged
with representing the class' interests have adequate incentives to do
so. The judge must ensure that the class representative has claims
and defenses that are "typical of the claims and defenses of the
class"5 0 such that those representatives will understand those inter-
ests. Not only should these interests be the same, but the judge must
ensure that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class."51 In other words, not only must the
judge ensure that the representatives' interests are aligned with
those of the class, but that the representatives can and will ade-
quately represent those interests. The judge also appoints the class
counsel, 52 inherently deciding the adequacy and desirability of using
particular attorneys on behalf of the absent class members. In addi-
tion, the judge oversees perhaps one of the most important aspects of
hiring counsel - the awarding and approval of fees.53 These func-
tions in theory give the judge leverage to ensure loyalty and adequacy
of representation by class counsel.
The judge's role is central with respect to settlement, which is
the predominant means by which class actions are resolved. Rule
23(e) directs that the judge approve any settlement, usually after a
fairness hearing to determine if the proposed settlement would meet
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). There is a question in the wake of Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556-59 (2011), as to whether commonality now re-
quires that common questions must predominate for any type of class action.
49. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
50. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(3).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g); FED. R. Civ. P 23(c)(1)(B).
53. This may encompass a wide variety of arrangements, from a contingency fee
to a lodestar method, although the availability of some fee arrangements has been
limited by statute. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15 (2013) (limiting contingency fee awards in coupon settle-
ments to the amount of coupons actually redeemed).
[Vol. 19:213228
Class Action in the Age of Twitter
the interests of the class members. 54 Here again the judge must sit in
place of the class members, with input from the other proxies.55
Though judges capably exercise their function to protect litigant
interests, there are limitations on the extent to which any third
party, no matter how neutral or competent, can adequately deter-
mine what those interests are. First, whether or not a group of liti-
gants are similar enough to each other to be treated as effectively
identical is itself an inquiry subject to the predispositions and biases
of any third party decision-maker. For example, the issues of numer-
osity, commonality, and typicality are malleable, and determining
whether or not they exist inherently depends largely upon how the
lawyers and the judge generalize or particularize the facts of the
case.
The Dukes case illustrates how the extent to which judges focus
on similarities versus dissimilarities in the putative class can lead to
different determinations of whether the plaintiffs (and their claims)
are uniform enough to warrant class treatment. In that case, plain-
tiff, Betty Dukes, attempted to certify a nationwide class to bring a
Title VII employment discrimination claim on behalf of women af-
fected by a demonstrated pattern and practice of gender discrimina-
tion in promotion and compensation decisions at Wal-Mart stores.
The majority and dissent in that case give contrasting descriptions of
the "questions of law or fact common to the class," which they use to
justify their different conclusions about whether Rule 23(a)(2) com-
monality exists. 56 The majority described the key question for pur-
poses of the Title VII claim in the Dukes case as one involving the
details of "literally millions of employment decisions at once."57 The
Court went on to explain that "[wiithout some glue holding the al-
leged reasons for all of those decisions together, it will be impossible
to say that examination of all class members' claims for relief [would]
produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfa-
vored."5 8 Framing the relevant inquiry around the individual acts of
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). For an overview of the forms and functions of fair-
ness hearings, see generally William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adver-
sarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435 (2006)
55. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of
Class Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYsis 167, 224 (2009).
56. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2508-13 (2011). The Dukes
certification petition was brought under Rule 23(b)(2). Although this paper largely
focuses on consumer claims and class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3), the case is
still instructive.
57. Id. at 2552.
58. Id. (emphasis in original).
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discretion of Wal-Mart's managers, the majority atomized the legal
claims and framed them as inappropriate for common treatment. The
dissent took the opposite approach, framing the primary legal ques-
tion (as did the lower court that granted certification) as "whether
Wal-Mart's pay and promotion practices give rise to discrimination
. . . ."59 Generalizing the inquiry in this way, the dissent could argue
that common questions existed as to whether Wal-Mart's implicit
practices, general culture, or failure to enforce its explicit antidis-
crimination led to the observed gender disparity.60
The conflicting framing of the question reflects the inherent
problem with creating an "entity" out of a group of individuals who
are inherently unique and whose claims could all theoretically be dis-
tinguished from one another. Whether aggregation is appropriate or
not has the potential to become a question resolved by artful framing
than by consideration of what plaintiffs want, how they consider
themselves to be similar, or cohesive as a class, and how their claims
would best be treated. But the Dukes case also provides an example
of how greater plaintiff participation could help to remedy the prob-
lem. The majority in Dukes rejects the plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence
of discrimination on the grounds that the number of incidents is too
few to draw any inference of widespread discrimination. 6' In doing
so, the majority, citing precedent, implies that greater numbers of
anecdotes could have sufficed to indicate the existence of a common
question.62 One implication of these dicta is that the members of a
putative class could give meaningful input into the extent and scope
of concepts like typicality and commonality. In this way they could
help the courts to understand their own interests, not as an "entity,"
but as a group of individuals informing whether common treatment is
appropriate and wanted.
Moreover, while judges by and large do extraordinary work to
protect plaintiff interests, there is an inherent problem with delegat-
ing such a large portion of this task because the judge's duty to effi-
ciently manage the case and act as a neutral may conflict with a duty
to effectively help create and protect the class. The judge's conception
of the nature of the class may affect his or her assessment of what its
best interests are. For example, it has been argued that a judge who
conceives of the class as an "entity" would be less likely to care about
59. Id. at 2564. The dissenting opinion agreed with the final result, but contested
the majority's analysis of Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement.
60. Id. at 2564-65.
61. Id. at 2555-56.
62. Id. (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)).
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the objections of a few individuals for whom class treatment is unfair,
since they would be irrelevant to the good of the collective. 63 The
Honda litigation described in the introduction is an example of a
judge struggling to resolve conflicting information about what is best
for the class members. In a similar example, discussed more fully be-
low, a judge in a class action lawsuit against a McDonald's franchise
in Michigan in 2013 made headlines when one class member started
a Facebook page objecting to the class settlement. 64 Despite support
from class members for the objection, the judge issued an injunction
ordering the comments to be removed from the Facebook page. Ulti-
mately, the injunction was lifted, and the original settlement was ap-
proved despite a large number of objections. The judge in that case
faced a difficult challenge attempting to reconcile the interests of the
abstract class-as-entity with the voiced concerns of actual members of
the class.
In addition, a number of other factors may make it difficult for a
judge to adequately account for the interests of absent complainants.
Heavy workloads and pressure to move through the docket may cause
a judge to approve a settlement without fully considering the absent
plaintiffs' interests.65 The already difficult task of trying to assess
critical points in the litigation through an absent party's lens is fur-
ther complicated by the judge's duty to consider the interests of the
other parties to the litigation. This may cut in the direction of bias in
favor of class members if the judge is overly focused on protecting the
interests of parties unable to participate in the litigation. Or a
heightened concern for fairness may lead to overcorrection in favor of
defendants. In either case, it is difficult to know how accurately a
judge is able to formulate the interests of absent class members. Rule
23 brings in other actors to assist with this process and ensure ade-
quate representation, but as the following discussion highlights, rely-
ing on these actors brings its own problems.
63. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 913, 941-42 (1997).
64. See Daniel Fisher, Facebook User Challenges Order to Take Down Criticism
of McDonald's Class Action, FORBEs (Feb. 23, 2013, 10:04 AM), http//www.forbes.
com/sites/danielfisher/2013/02/23/facebook-user-challenges-order-to-take-down-criti-
cism-of-mcdonalds-class-action/.
65. See, e.g., Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient
in Public Satisfaction, 44 S. CT. REV. 4, 17 (2007) ("All judges face real-world pres-
sures. For many judges, volume creates pressure to move cases in assembly-line fash-
ion - a method that obviously lacks in opportunities for the people involved in that
proceeding to feel that they were listened to and treated with respect.").
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2. Class Counsel
The lawyers appointed to represent a class perform a crucial
function in representing class members' interests in a dispute. How-
ever, class treatment means that the counsels' obligations, practices,
and incentives often diverge from what they would be in non-aggre-
gate litigation. The class lawyers effectively create the class in the
sense that they frame the cause of action, identify the characteristics
of the individuals harmed, and take primary responsibility for formu-
lating the interests of the class members. 66 They are largely responsi-
ble for choosing the class representative and defining the contours
and membership of the class. The lawyers theoretically act as agents
for the plaintiffs, although there is often little or no relationship be-
tween principal and agent. It is frequently observed that, "the reality
[is] that most class action litigation is dominated by class counsel."67
In a class action, the point of contact between counsel and client
is reduced and simplified to something resembling a mere formality.
That reality sits at odds with the basic idea of litigant autonomy. 68 At
the beginning of an action, the class action procedure turns the tradi-
tional model of the lawyer-client relationship on its head - instead of
the client approaching the lawyer for representation, the lawyer does
the work of finding the cause of action, locating a suitable lead plain-
tiff, and then bringing the other plaintiffs along for the ride.69 It has
even been suggested that the class is, in reality, a product of its coun-
sel's imagination because it involves legal ideas more than it does
actual people. 70 There is little or no mechanism in many cases (with
certain exceptions such as opt-out rights, as discussed below) for
plaintiffs in the class to express any approval or disapproval of the
action. Moreover, although plaintiffs technically have rights to lodge
objections to a settlement and have their views heard in court, in
practice most plaintiffs (other than special interest groups or profes-
sional objectors) will never understand the significance of the action
or know how to have an impact in it.
In addition to posing problems for autonomy, the lack of lawyer-
client interaction and monitoring creates risks of a moral hazard or
66. See Lahav, supra note 9, at 1940.
67. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An In-
quiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 597 (2003).
68. See Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy,
and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1573, 1587 (2007).
69. See Lahav, supra note 9, at 1939.
70. See id.
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at least a misapprehension of the class members' interests.7' These
issues manifest in various ways that have been the subject of policy
concern: lawyers settling too early to curtail the cost of litigation for
both sides, but before an adequate assessment of issues or remedies
can be completed;72 settlements involving inadequate compensation
to plaintiffs, such as so called "coupon settlements" involving dis-
counts for the defendant's goods or services, which are cheap to de-
fendants and often underused by plaintiffs;73 or settlements
involving future classes of plaintiffs, which have been controversial
in terms of their adequacy and fairness to plaintiffs not yet identi-
fied.7 4 Not all of these problems are present in every class action. Nor
are they all exclusive to litigation involving aggregations of plaintiffs.
However, the attenuation of the lawyer-client relationship enhances
the likelihood that such can arise. And while judges perform substan-
tial duties to ensure that these abuses do not occur, they can be bur-
densome and difficult to address. Moreover, leaving all monitoring
duties in the hands of unelected neutrals creates further tension with
ideas of democratic legitimacy. Rule 23 provides steps to address the
democratic legitimacy and monitoring problems just described by
providing for the appointment of one or a number of representative
plaintiffs. As the next Part discusses, however, the representative(s)
are frequently inadequate to address these problems.
71. This is especially true in the context of settlement, which is the primary reso-
lution mechanism for these actions.
72. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under At-
tack, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1649, 1657 (2008) (describing the interest of class counsel in
quickly achieving settlement).
73. See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements
in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REv. 991, 991-95
(2001) (discussing coupon settlements and their practical uses). One study concluded
that a very small percentage of such coupons are ever redeemed, and makes the point
that consumers may not want to support a defendant who they feel wronged them in
the past. Id. at 1005.
74. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997); see also
Nagareda, Put Options, supra note 31, at 752. The American Law Institute's Princi-
ples of Aggregate Litigation also grapple with these issues in the related context of
settlements in non-class aggregate litigation. The American Law Institute's proposed
rule confers greater leeway to class counsel to settle on behalf of multiple joined plain-
tiffs, but not class plaintiffs. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITI-
GATION (2010). This has been described as problematic for similar reasons as those
stated here: potential for conflicting interests and moral hazard dilemmas. See Judith
Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Pro-
cess and of Lawyers' Powers, 79 GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 628, 634-36 (2011).
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3. The Class Representative
The representative as proxy is both a key feature and key source
of problems in class litigation. The class representative is meant to be
the embodiment of the absent class, advocating for its interests
before the court and ensuring lawyer loyalty.75 As such, the represen-
tative has frequently been characterized as the "voice" of the class
members in such litigation. The presence of an adequate representa-
tive is a key component of the due process justification for applying
preclusive effects to judgments involving absent parties.76 Central to
the idea of effective representation is the uniformity and "cohesive-
ness" of the class,77 a factor determined by the judge, as previously
discussed. The idea of the adequacy of representation is the primary
basis for claim preclusion.78
Despite his or her theoretical centrality to the class action's
preclusive effect,79 the class representative is rarely able to represent
75. It should be noted that some scholars differ as to the proper theoretical ratio-
nale for allowing a preclusive effect on absent class members when adequate repre-
sentation is involved. See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative
Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 577, 625-266 (2010) [hereinafter Puzzling Ideal. I note that the existence of the
debate is a result of an underlying need to find a theoretical justification for represen-
tative litigation that is consistent with the values of the American justice system. The
debate is evidence that the current justifications do not fit well with these values, and
suggests the desirability of changing the system, rather than formulating ever more
elaborate justifications for the existing system.
76. See Klonoff, Decline, supra note 1, at 37 ("Because class actions are represen-
tative actions, 'adequacy' is the glue that holds a class together and ensures due pro-
cess for absent class members."). But see Bone, Puzzling Idea, supra note 75, at 626
("[Tihe institutional view of the day-in-court right might accommodate a relatively
limited collateral attack rule, because it does not depend on adequate representation
as a substitute for personal control. Rather, it depends on showing that an absent
class member has only a right to limited control in the first place.").
77. Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 40, at 435.
78. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson: A
RawlsianIBehavioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMoRY
L.J. 279, 288-300 (2006) (relying in part on a Rawlsian approach to develop standards
for assessing adequate representation for class action settlements); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Stan-
dard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 590-97 (2003) (justifying a hypothetical consent
standard for evaluating the significance of conflicts of interest). See generally Bruce L.
Hay, Procedural Justice - Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1843-47
(1997) (using a Rawlsian veil-of-ignorance argument to justify an ex ante contracting
approach to procedural justice with respect to representative action).
79. See 18A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4457, at 514 (2d ed. 2012) (2002) (noting that "class-action procedure provides many
explicit safeguards designed to ensure adequate representation"); Klonoff, Decline,
supra note 1 at 37 ("The system [of class representation] breaks down - and poten-
tial due process issues arise - if either the class representative or class counsel is
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the class for several reasons. First, the representative frequently
plays almost no material part in the litigation or settlement negotia-
tions. 0 Although a lot of attention goes into selecting the representa-
tive and determining his or her adequacy, he or she is often ignored
when attempting to affect the litigation.81
Second, even if the representative could play a greater role, the
individual's incentives frequently become misaligned with those of
other class members. This is because the representative often stands
to gain much more from a negotiated settlement than the average
class member, as these people are usually paid a much larger award
for their service and thus have very different stakes in the outcome.
Yet, this is not seen by courts as casting doubt on the representative's
ability to represent or the resultant due process analysis. In addition,
in some instances law firms have kept potential representatives on
retainer, raising clear issues with regard to their loyalties. 82 Though
not all representatives face such issues, many of them have relation-
ships with class counsel that differ greatly from those of the other
class members, and it is doubtful that representatives can indepen-
dent and vigorous on behalf of an abstract group of people when deal-
ing with the very real and concrete counsel. Moreover, this person is
unelected, unaccountable, and has little or no contact with those he
or she represents, casting further doubt on his or her ability ade-
quately represent the group's interests.
Third, even if the class representative participated materially in
the litigation or settlement negotiations and had no conflicts of inter-
est, it would be difficult for one individual to represent the various
interests of class members, especially as a class grows large. Plain-
tiffs in litigation cannot be assumed to be homogeneous, although the
structure of class litigation forces them to be treated as such. Individ-
uals who make up a class may want different things. Some may want
to feel that they are fairly compensated. Some want revenge. Some
incompetent, suffers from a conflict of interest, fails to assert claims with sufficient
vigor, or suffers from other flaws that will detract from a full presentation of the
merits.").
80. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems
and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 109 (2007) [hereinafter
Significance].
81. See id. at 110.
82. See Lester Brickman, Anatomy of an Aggregate Settlement: The Triumph of
Temptation over Ethics, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 700, 705 (2010).
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want to see justice done. Still others simply want closure or an apol-
ogy, or to ensure that whatever gave rise to the lawsuit never hap-
pens again. Some will not care at all.83 The Honda litigation example
above demonstrates this, as does the McDonald's litigation, briefly
touched on above and described in more detail below. An unelected
representative with no contact with class members has little way of
knowing how to effectively represent them.
It is tempting to conclude that such a divergence of interests is
largely irrelevant, because the important interests are only those rel-
evant to the questions to be adjudicated in court. As long as the facts
and circumstances of the cause of action are the same, the individual
wants and desires of class members should not make a difference in a
class proceeding. However, this argument ignores the fact that class
action settlements frequently result in outcomes that are unrelated
to the common facts and circumstances of causes of action. Nonethe-
less, these settlements impact class members and therefore would
benefit from real input.84
4. Intervenors
A final proxy is the intervening party or objector. These are typi-
cally members of the class (or those purporting to represent their in-
terests) who decide to object to a given decision, settlement terms or
other aspect of the litigation. Whether or not intervenors play a large
role in any given litigation varies depending on factors such as the
size of the class, the societal importance of the issues at stake, and
the value of any potential award resulting from the suit.
Intervenors or objectors can play a crucial role in certain circum-
stances, such as where such parties raise concerns on behalf of the
class members or serve as a check on class counsel's ability to enter
83. See Tamara Relis, "It's Not about the Money!" A Theory of Misconceptions of
Plaintiffs' Litigation Aims, 68 U. Prrr. L. REV. 701, 723 (2006) ("Plaintiffs' articulated
litigation aims were largely composed of extra-legal objectives of principle, with 41%
not mentioning monetary compensation at all, 35% saying it was of secondary impor-
tance, 18% describing money as their primary objective in suing, and only one person
(6%) saying it was money alone.")
84. In another recent example, a class settlement over Facebook Inc.'s alleged
sale of user data to third party customers, cuts the class members entirely out of both
any monetary distribution, and includes no promise on the part of Facebook to refrain
from such practices in the future. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir.
2012), rehearing denied, 709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013). This case in particular would
have been ripe for class member input, given their status as users of Facebook. A
petition for certiorari in the case has been filed in the United States Supreme Court.
See Marek v. Lane, No. 13-136 (2013).
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into settlements that are not in the best interests of the class.85 Al-
lowing for such objections and interventions provides a measure of
"voice," the practical effect of which amounts to the creation of self-
appointed proxies to speak for the other members of the class.
However, as a means to represent the class as a whole, interven-
ors and objectors have similar limitations to truly representing the
class' interests that other proxies do. Moreover, the way in which the
Rules and consequently the courts treat such objectors - essentially
as outside non-parties - erects unnecessary procedural hurdles to
utilizing the intervention mechanism,86 meaning that only savvy and
well organized plaintiffs can usually effectively object or intervene.
And, although the objectors do not necessarily speak for all other
class members, other constituents of the supposed entity have little
opportunity to affirm or take issue with objections raised. That is po-
tentially problematic, given that such intervenors sometimes lodge
objections for parochial reasons that may or may not align with the
interests of the class. Indeed, in some class lawsuits, the presence of
"professional objectors" who intervene solely to blackmail the lead
counsel into giving them a cut of the award has been problematic.8 7
Such problems place additional monitoring and policing burdens on
judges and lawyers who must act without much, if any, input from a
significant portion of the class members.
5. Protection of Individuality: Opt-out Rights
Each of the types of actors just described plays a role in class
action governance by serving as proxies for absent class members.
The fifth type of governance structure, the opt-out rights described
below, is the only one that purportedly gathers input from the class
members themselves.
Civil actions based on Rule 23(b)(3) (the part of Rule 23 gov-
erning class actions in which monetary damages are to be awarded)
entail a requirement that notice and an opportunity to "opt-out" be
available to allow litigants to take themselves out of the class before
85. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Improving the Class Action Settlement Process:
Little Things Mean a Lot, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 428, 428-35 (2010) (recounting a
prominent attorney's attempt to represent a class member who wished to object to a
settlement).
86. See Lahav, supra note 9, at 1943-44 (discussing the intervention mechanism,
and the fact that class members are forced to proceed as non-parties, as an example of
the tension between the individual and entity model).
87. See Leslie, Significance, supra note 80, at 109.
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being subject to a preclusive judgment.88 For certain actions, plain-
tiffs have two such opportunities - one at the certification stage and
one before a settlement is reached.89 In the case of the opt-out, class
members theoretically have an opportunity to exercise autonomy.90
Although allowing for opt-out is a relatively straightforward and
simplified solution, it is a crude substitute for autonomy for two rea-
sons: first, it presents the action (and any attendant settlement) as a
take-it-or leave-it proposition, and second, it provides only one alter-
native to the action as designed by class counsel - exit. In many
cases, leaving the action means no recourse at all for putative class
members, and therefore exercising this option is highly costly. In
cases where any potential recovery would be less than the cost of
suit - so-called negative value claims - exit makes sense only if
there is a substantial coalition of exiting litigants to pool resources
and bring a separate collective action. However, opt-out rights do lit-
tle to identify and connect claimants who may wish to bring a sepa-
rate action. For all practical purposes therefore, most claimants can
benefit from court-created collective action only by accepting a pro-
cess that he or she had no part in shaping.
It can be argued that preventing claimants from exercising much
autonomy is justified by necessity, especially in the context of nega-
tive value claims, because there is no realistic alternative. Even be-
yond negative value claims, such a tradeoff could be justified by the
fact that class counsel takes on the risk and expenditure of carrying
out the lawsuit. These justifications, however valid, do not require
that any optionality be as binary and un-nuanced as simply accepting
or rejecting pre-shaped litigation. Nor does such a process serve the
goal of procedural fairness very well, since a binary choice is likely to
provide little satisfaction or feeling of control.9 1 Claimants could be
88. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011)
(discussing the certification requirements under Rule 23(b)(3)). This option is only
available for class actions where money damages are primarily sought. Typically,
class actions under Rule 23 (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(2) are "mandatory," meaning that
once the class is certified, absent class members may not withdraw from the action.
89. The provision of an opt-out right at the settlement stage was adopted in 2003
and came out of an era of reflection on settlement problems marked most notably by
the Amchem and Ortiz cases. See FED. R. CIv. P. advisory committee's note (2003).
90. See Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an
Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMoRy L.J. 85, 106 (1997);
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1538
(2004).
91. Cf Michal Krawczyk, A Model of Procedural and Distributive Fairness, 70
THEORY AND DECISION 111 (2011) (describing negative reactions to lack of control over
process in ultimatum game experiments).
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given choices about what parts of the dispute are most important and
what components of a settlement would be most satisfactory, instead
of being asked to accept or reject whole packages of claims and de-
mands. And even where complete exit is the only workable option to
provide putative class members, exit need not leave a potential plain-
tiff completely out of the process. It could instead lead to a different
process by which those who exit could provide feedback with respect
to their priorities to facilitate sorting themselves according to their
interests and connecting with others to other to more easily organize
litigation or some other action to better suit their needs.
Another defense of opt-out rights argues that exit in large num-
bers provides a signal to judges and other actors that there is a prob-
lem with the action of the settlement, and that therefore exit is better
than voice as a governance mechanism. 92 This may be true in certain
circumstances. However, relying on simple opt-out rights per se to act
as a signal is unreliable at best. In order to effectively protest, a large
number of individuals would usually have to exit to send a strong a
signal. While this may be less difficult in securities and other types of
actions where a relatively small number of decision makers form the
class, it presents a problem for giving effective voice to dissenters
when large number of plaintiffs are involved.93 A more balanced col-
lective action approach could provide for more meaningful signaling,
if not more meaningful participation.
The forgoing discussion of class action procedures highlights
some of the problems arising from a simplified view of the class re-
flected in its governance structures. Procedures that deal largely
with an abstract entity governed by a small number of actors
predominate over procedures designed to tap individual interests or
create space for autonomy. This approach to mass dispute processing,
while at times controversial, was entirely reasonable in 1966 when
there were no realistic alternatives. However, in an era in which
technological advances provide avenues for greater levels of engage-
ment, more expansive ideas of plaintiff participation can be accom-
modated without detracting unreasonably from efficiency. The means
92. John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Ac-
tions: Why "Exit" Works Better than "Voice," 30 CARDOZo L. REv. 407, 409 (2008) (ar-
guing in the context of securities litigation that exit rights promote better alignment
of incentives).
93. See Leslie, Significance, supra note 80, at 112 (discussing objections in class
action law suits as collective action problems, for which the facilitation of intra-class
communication could be helpful).
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by which groups of people can engage both en masse and as individu-
als are beginning to make themselves evident and worth exploration.
III. WEB 2.0's IMPACT ON COLLECTIVE AcTION DYNAMics
The technologies of social networking are providing a model of
social organization that is relevant to aggregate dispute resolution.
So-called "Web 2.0" technologies 94 have facilitated the formation of
new types of groups, changed the ways that individuals can interact
within groups, and enhanced the level of impact that single individu-
als can have on a group or an entire system, using relatively few re-
sources. However, these technologies have their drawbacks, and it is
far from obvious that the tools of mass communication can provide a
compelling basis for a change in the legal norms governing class ac-
tions. Determining whether such tools can and should be incorpo-
rated requires examining the impact of technology on group and
collective behavior in relation to disputes that class actions are
meant to address and the means by which class actions operate.
The discussion and examples below show how technology allows
people to participate in dispute resolution - both in and out of for-
malized processes. These examples also illustrate how technology is
facilitating formation and action by groups which are more dynamic
than those imagined in traditional class action theory. In doing so, it
is revealing a more nuanced set of recognizable actors within a large
groups of disputants, instead of a dispute landscape populated only
by individuals requiring individualized solutions or an abstract amal-
gamation of represented interests.95 These emerging realities sug-
gest both rationale and means of improving existing processes, if
such procedures are to remain useful and relevant.
A. General Dynamics of Social Media and Internet-Based Group
Behavior
The Internet, social networking technology, and new media have
changed people's ability to interact with the world and with each
other. These networks allow users to go beyond traditional forms of
94. Web 2.0 commonly refers to interactive and collaborative means of communi-
cating via the Internet, using a variety of technologies including computes,
smartphones, and tablets.
95. Cf Burch, supra note 35, at 99 n.43 (making a similar observation in non-
class aggregate lawsuits that "group-oriented individuals and individuals within the
collective are best conceived not as a dichotomy, but as points along a spectrum of
group cohesion"); Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 23, at 6 (observing that different con-
flict resolution systems exist unnecessarily for individual and systemic problems).
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Internet communication such as e-mail to establish online personas
and portals into their individual worlds, which they can open or close
to others as they choose. These networks allow people to connect in
ways that were not possible before - creating communities of people
sharing friendship, common experiences, or support of special causes
across the world. Applications like Facebook and Twitter, which are
usually as easy to access as reaching into one's pocket, allow people to
find like-minded others, communicate with thousands or even mil-
lions of people at once, and form social groups despite barriers that
may have once existed. These tools have been game changers in the
way that individuals interact with each other, larger social groups,
governments, and the rest of society.
Three changes facilitated by social networking technology are
worth noting for purposes of this analysis. Such changes, described
further below, are: (1) aiding individuals to create collective action, or
at the very least leverage the threat of collective action, at a very low
cost; (2) enhancing people's ability to amplify their individual pres-
ence and influence in groups and in society more broadly; and (3) in-
creasing individuals' ability to find and form groups around a broader
range of different types of interest, and expanding individuals' partic-
ipation in those groups.
1. Aiding and Changing Collective Action
Social networking technology and communication technology
have been useful in lowering cost barriers to certain types of collec-
tive action. Typically, collective action requires at minimum two ele-
ments: (1) that the cost of individual group members' participation be
low relative to the benefits gained, and (2 ) that group members have
the ability to coordinate among each other.96 Technology affects both
requirements.
Technology has the potential to change the cost-benefit calculus
by increasing the impact of simple low-cost actions while at the same
time reducing the time, effort, and resources required for participa-
tion in those actions. For example, protesting an Internet company's
change in its privacy policies could take the form of sending or post-
ing a message to the company, giving indications of support for the
actions of the protest group on discussion forums or outlets like
Facebook and Twitter, or more maliciously, directing large amounts
of Internet traffic to the company's website to burden its servers and
cause nuisance. One can participate in such a protest with relatively
96. See Leslie, Significance, supra note 80, at 97.
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little effort, without even leaving one's house or seeing another
human being. The actions needed are easy to take for individuals, but
for a firm that values image and public perception, the collective im-
pact can be high.
Technology also facilitates coordination by allowing for easier
multidirectional communication and information flow, potentially en-
abling collective action even where the cost is high. Efforts borne by a
few members can be more easily communicated and adopted by
others in the group, giving those efforts critical mass without the ex-
penditure of time and energy traditionally required. A vivid example
of technology's impact on coordination is the "Arab Spring" in 2011,
which saw the overthrow of longstanding governmental regimes
throughout Northern Africa.97 In these uprisings, online social net-
works were used heavily to organize widespread protests and gather
critical mass, drawing ever more people despite the potential risks for
participants.98 Less pronounced, but no less impactful examples have
been seen in online protests related to social issues like climate
change and consumer complaints.
In addition, there is evidence that online media is changing the
way that groups engage individuals involved in collective efforts. Al-
though it is a nascent area of research, early studies indicate that
traditional bases of social solidarity, such as churches, political par-
ties, or community groups are no longer required for involving people
in collective processes 99 and that individuals' own narratives are be-
coming prominent in such efforts. The new prominence of individual
voices comes at a cost however, in that organizations that formerly
maintained strong and clear messages, struggle to do so while accom-
modating so many diverse voices. Despite this disadvantage, more
personalized forms of collective action, such as those facilitated by
online media, appear to maintain higher levels of engagement, focus
on ultimate goals, and strength among the network of individuals
than traditional types of organizations. 100
97. See Ashraf M. Attia et al., Commentary: The Impact of Social Networking
Tools on Political Change in Egypt's "Revolution 2.0," 10 ELcCRONIC COM. RES. &
APPLICATIONS 369 (2011); Bruce Etling et al., Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Polit-
ics and Dissent Online, 12 NEW MEDIA Soc'Y 1225 (2010).
98. See, e.g., Marko M. Skoric et al., Online Organization of an Offline Protest:
From Social to Traditional Media and Back, 44TH HAWAii INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCES (HICSS) 1, 1-8 (2011).
' 99. See W. Lance Bennett & Alexandra Segerberg, Digital Media and the Per-
sonalization of Collective Action, 14 INF. CoMMUN. Soc. 770, 771 (2011).
100. Id.
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2. Enhancing Individual Presence and Influenre
Beyond extending people's ability to communicate and share
ideas, social networking the Internet have the potential to amplify
the impact of individuals' messages and actions throughout the
world 01 and, in effect, enhance their influence. This is because such
technologies greatly lower the cost of disseminating one's thoughts,
opinions, ideas, actions, and interests, as well as minimize the barri-
ers to others of receiving such information. Using older media, up-
take of a particular message depended heavily on who happened to
see or hear the message at the moment it was available and whether
it seemed persuasive at the time. With new media, messages, videos,
and other forms of expression can be repeated and passed along by
others who are sympathetic (for example, by "re-tweeting") continu-
ously and via a medium that many people can and do access from
anywhere. Thus, the chances that a persistently broadcast idea will
reach large numbers of people, particularly those paying attention to
issues related to the message, are far greater than the chances were
even a few years ago. Of course, such a proliferation of communiqu6s
in the Internet space can also have the effect of drowning an individ-
ual's voice in a sea of others. Some forms of social media, networking
sites, and other modalities filter the Internet noise based upon an
individual's social connections, demographics and selected criteria,
thus limiting the scope of transmission and enhancing an individual's
ability to be present within a group relevant to him or her.
3. Enhancing Individual Voice Within Collectives, While
Maintaining the Characteristics of the Collective
Social networking and similar activities increase a person's abil-
ity to express him or herself in a collective setting, while developing
greater affinity for the collective and commitment to its shared en-
deavors. 102 At the same time, groups are able to maintain cohesion.
101. For a more in-depth articulation of this contention, see MANUEL CASTELLS,
COMMUNICATION POWER 53-71 (2009) (arguing that the Web 2.0 platforms have cre-
ated the "mass communication of the self," a form of communication where messages
created by individuals can reach global audiences, allow audiences to take charge of
their communicative practices, and give rise to unprecedented levels of autonomy).
102. Akshay Java et al., Why We Twitter: Understanding Microblogging Usage
and Communities, PROC. OF THE 9TH WEBKDD & 1ST SNA-KDD 2007 WORKSHOP ON
WEB MINING AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIs 56, 64, http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
1348549.1348556 (last visited July 11, 2012).
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While this dynamic is not unique to online interaction, 03 the In-
ternet is able to greatly facilitate it.
Internet-based communication facilitates participation in groups
for many of the same reasons it facilitates collective action: by lower-
ing the required resources, time, and effort. It also frequently encour-
ages group member contribution by increasing his or her sense of
psychological security and lowering the perception of social risk.104
Simply put, many people feel far more comfortable typing a mes-
sage - even if the message will be seen by thousands - than they
would delivering their opinions in front of dozens. Moreover, it has
been theorized that increased social networking enhances the process
of individuation, a process that occurs through social interaction. 05
At the same time, the social aspect of online communication, and
the ease with which people can find like-minded others, increase the
chance that individuals will develop feelings of affiliation with those
in their chosen networks.106 This, in turn, can result in greater feel-
ings of responsibility and social cohesion toward members of those
networks.' 07
103. Of Burch, supra note 35, at 16 (describing a similar process in mass tort
litigation: "Simply put, a plural subject is an instance where multiple individuals -
several 'I's' - become a single, plural subject - a 'we.' As an umbrella term, what
makes plaintiffs a plural subject can vary greatly: litigants might knowingly share
similar desires, interests, intentions, goals, or commitments concerning the litigation;
they might collectively participate in a litigation-related activity; or they might design
a group policy concerning the litigation").
104. See John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BE-
HAVIOR, 321, 321 (2004) (discussing people's increased feeling of psychological security
participating in online settings).
105. Bernard Stiegler, Teleologics of the Snail: The Errant Self Wired to a WiMax
Network. 26 THEORY, CULTURE AND Soc'y 33, 42-48 (2009) (arguing that, because in-
dividuation is caused through the act of speaking out, the use of social networking
sites constitutes original processes of psychological and collective individuation and
construction of a "digital singularity," a process that can lead to the growth of individ-
ual expression and creativity).
106. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Ob-
ligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 119 n.141 (2011) ("Mass tort litigants already form con-
nections with one another through these social networking sites. For examples, see
"Equal Treatment for Non-US Vioxx Victims" Facebook group, which petitioned for
compensation on behalf of British victims, the "Agent Orange Lawsuit Filed by
Vietnamese Victims" Facebook group, and the "Merck Settlement Group" on Yahoo!'s
groups page. Facebook, Equal Treatment for Non-US Vioxx Victims, http//www.
facebook.com/groupphp?sid=7eefl56f24dacee8951038d54df30e2e&gid=86112 02842;
Facebook, Agent Orange Lawsuit Filed by Vietnamese Victims, http://www.facebook.
com/group.php?sid=0&gid=2619520859; Merck Settlement Group page, http//groups.
yahoo.com/group/MerckSettlement/.").
107. Kwok Leung, Kwok-Kit Tong & E. Allan Lind, Realpolitik Versus Fair Pro-
cess: Moderating Effects of Group Identification on Acceptance of Political Decisions, 3
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 476, 476-77 (2007); Burch, supra note 35, at 15-24
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projects and further formation of group identity. For instance,
messages and information need not be confined to their own original
content. They can be approved or disapproved by others (e.g., by "lik-
ing" content on Facebook), commented upon, or even amended. While
this may not always serve the ends of accuracy,' 08 it illustrates the
possibility for groups collectively to process ideas, and provides space
for both aggregate sentiment and individual viewpoints.
B. Experience of Internet-Based Collective Dispute Resolution
The Internet's ability to enhance individual autonomy while pre-
serving the value of groups can be observed both in and out of the
litigation context, as the following subparts illustrate. These exam-
ples suggest that there are a number of roles litigants and litigant
groups can play using social media and the Internet that they have
seldom been able to play in the past.
1. Consumer Disputes
Consumer disputes supply useful examples of how Internet-
based group dynamics are affecting dispute resolution. These dis-
putes are instructive because consumer-facing industries are among
the most experienced with Internet-based disputes and dispute reso-
lution. Consumer disputes also provide an interesting foil to class ac-
tions in part because consumer collective action was one of the salient
problems that the writers of the modern Rule 23 sought to address
when they designed the existing process. 09
In the sphere of consumer relations, social networking works as a
tool to increase the leverage that an individual disputant can apply in
dispute resolution. Complaints in this context work because compa-
nies value their reputations, and social networking allows for the
reputational effects of even one complaint to become amplified."o In-
dividuals are able to disseminate information quickly and easily
about poor treatment by a company, adding transparency and greater
(noting that group-oriented individuals and individuals-within-the-collective are best
conceived not as a dichotomy, but as points along a spectrum of group cohesion).
108. But see Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopedias Go Head to Head, 438 NATURE 900,
901 (comparing Wikipedia to Encyclopedia Britannica and finding Wikipedia to be
more accurate).
109. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
110. See T.M. Tripp & Y. Gregoire, When Unhappy Customers Strike Back on the
Internet, 52 SLOAN MGMT. REv. 37, 37-38. Some of the deterrent effect of class action
lawsuits is thought to operate in a similar way, through the operation of the reputa-
tional markets.
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accountability to what would otherwise be isolated and unknown oc-
currences. This ability gives individuals a potentially great amount of
influence, and companies have learned that this influence can cut in
both positive and negative directions. By employing entire teams
dedicated to social networking issues, many companies now actively
monitor Twitter and other social networking outlets for evidence of
grievances, in the hope of resolving problems quickly and avoiding an
exponential growth in complaints via social media."' 1
Social media protests are a significant potential sanction against
firms and provide incentives for them to change their behavior. Air-
lines in particular have experienced the damage that can be caused
by vociferous consumers with particular complaints. A few notable
examples illustrate how social media can resolve complaints and
even induce firms to change their behavior. In one prominent case,
consumer outcry forced Delta Airlines to change its policy and waive
baggage fees for soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.112 In
another well-publicized example, United Airlines suffered a public re-
lations crisis when a musician whose guitar was damaged by baggage
handlers posted a song about it on YouTube."x3 The airline was
forced to pay for the damage and consequently implemented new pro-
cedures to deal with similar issues. Other prominent examples have
occurred with companies such as PayPalll 4 and ChapStick."15
In addition to giving individuals leverage, social media is some-
times used to draw in disputants who were formerly outside of the
dispute resolution process. Unlike traditional complaint handling
mechanisms, networking technologies allow firms to find customer
grievances even when not directed at the firms. Because of the
searchable nature of Internet communications, companies can moni-
tor chatter for signs of discontent with their products, services, or the
111. See Lisa Bachelor, Complain on Twitter for an Instant Response, THE OB-
SERVER (May 12, 2012) http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/may/12/complaint-
air-on-twitter.
112. Rogene F. Jacquette, Delta Apologizes for Charging Returning Troops $2,800
Baggage Fee, N.Y. TIMEs AT WAR BLOG (June 8, 2011), http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.
com/2011/06/08/delta-apologies-for-charging-returning-troops-2800-baggage-fee/.
113. Brett Snyder, United Aggressively Responds to "United Breaks Guitars Part
2," CBS NEWS (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-43641055/
united-aggressively-responds-to-united-breaks-guitars-part-2/.
114. Shannon McKarney, PayPal: You Can Help Cats, Not People CARE2.com (Dec.
6, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.care2.com/causes/paypal-you-can-help-cats-not-people.
html.
115. Tim Nudd, ChapStick Gets Itself in a Social Media Death Spiral, ADWEEK
(Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.adweek.com/adfreak/chapstick-gets-itself-social-media-
death-spiral-136097.
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handling of a certain situation; and respond accordingly. 1 16 Moren-
ver, customer problems can be resolved much more quickly through
new Internet technologies than through traditional mechanisms.117
The use of such technologies can allow for a more proactive and per-
haps preventive form of dispute processing.
The forgoing examples illustrate interesting trends in how indi-
viduals can impact disputes in ways that were traditionally possible
only through court-sponsored mechanisms. Admittedly, these exam-
ples arise from a relatively narrow set of disputes involving claims
that would not be cognizable in court and would-be defendants who
have an interest in keeping complaining customers happy. Nonethe-
less, they demonstrate the potential for providing signaling, compen-
sation, and deterrence in low value disputes involving systemic
issues that might once have only been possible through aggregation.
2. New Collective Elements in Litigation
Social media and the Internet have facilitated new types of group
participation in formal litigation processes as well. Three types of ex-
amples described below illustrate how. One set of examples demon-
strates how Web 2.0 technologies can bring about some of the
functions of class actions without involving the legal system. They
show how Internet organizing or social media-based protests can per-
form the signaling function of class litigation by raising the aware-
ness of the public and regulators about unfair consumer practices.
Social media's ability to disseminate information quickly about al-
leged wrongdoing can in turn perform some of the deterrent function
of class litigation because the firm in question will react to public
outcry and the threat of regulatory action arising from its behavior.
Another set of examples shows how Internet activity might in-
form and shape litigation from the ground up. This can happen either
by tipping off lawyers to invidious, illegal practices and allowing
them to locate plaintiffs, or by giving individuals the tools they need
to more easily bring individual or collective actions in court.
116. See, e.g., A Day in the Life: Social Media, JETBLUE BLUE TALEs BLOG (Jan. 19,
2012), http://blog.jetblue.com/index.php/2012/01/19/a-day-in-the-life-social-media/.
117. See, e.g., Lisa Bachelor, supra note 111 ("Companies as diverse as banks, gym
chains, travel agencies and large retailers are using Twitter and, to a lesser extent,
Facebook, to resolve consumer complaints in hours or even minutes rather than the
usual days, weeks, or months."); David K. Israel, Twitter: The New Old Customer Ser-
vice?, WIRED.COM (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.wired.com/geekdad/2012/09/twitter-
the-new-old-customer-service/.
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A third category of examples demonstrates how litigants in a
class action can communicate with each other and organize and sort
themselves, independently of the actions of the court or the class
counsel, and how important communication relevant to litigation can
be effected among class members. These examples demonstrate how
litigants can have a greater level of involvement in collective
processes.
3. Web 2.0 Dispute Resolution Outside the Legal System -
Verizon Wireless and Bank of America
In December 2011, Verizon Wireless announced that, beginning
the following month, it would be charging its customers an additional
$2 "convenience fee" for one-time bill payments made by phone and
online.118 The company claimed that the fee was intended to make up
for costs associated with processing credit and debit card payments.
The move sparked an enormous protest via Twitter, with a massive
volume of customers issuing complaints, some threatening to termi-
nate their contracts,1"9 and others launching an online petition to
have the practice changed.120 The attention brought to the issue
stirred the Federal Communications Commission, whose chairman
issued a statement questioning the necessity of such fees and stating
that the Commission would look into it. In the end, Verizon an-
nounced that it was dropping its plans to institute the new policy due
to consumer outrage.121 Verizon's main competitors, AT&T and
Sprint, issued statements saying that they did not engage in similar
practices. 122
Bank of America faced a similar dispute in late 2011 when it at-
tempted to impose a $5 monthly fee on accounts using debit cards for
118. Ron Lieber & Brian X. Chen, An Uproar on the Web Over $2 Fee by Verizon,
THE N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/business/media/
an-uproar-on-the-web-over-2-fee-by-verizon.html.
119. See Sinead Carew, Verizon Ditches $2 Fee After Customer Uproar, REUTERS,
(Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/30/us-verizon-fcc-idUSTRE7
BT13120111230.
120. To view the petition, see Molly Katchpole, Tell Verizon: Drop the Fee for Pay-
ing Bills Online, CHANGE.ORG (Dec. 2011), http://www.change.org/petitions/tell-ver-
izon-drop-the-fee-for-paying-bills-online.
121. See Carew, supra note 119; see also Greg Bensinger, UPDATE: Verizon Backs
Off $2 Fee Plan After User Complaints, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30, 2011), http-/online.wj.
com/article/BT-CO-20111230-707071.html.
122. See Carew, supra note 119; see also Greg Bensinger, UPDATE: Verizon Backs
Off $2 Fee Plan After User Complaints, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30, 2011), http//online.wj.
com/article/BT-CO-20111230-707071.html.
[Vol. 19:213248
Class Action in the Age of Twitter
trninsczt.ionsf 123 Thp -nw fe. led to s ehngA.org nptition and an on-
line protest instituted by underemployed, recent college graduate,
Molly Katchpole.124 The petition sparked an online protest, gathering
over 200,000 people. In the process, watchdog groups such as Con-
sumers Union reached out to 780,000 of its members and managed to
have 40,000 people send letters asking for a Congressional investiga-
tion of the fees. 125 A few weeks after Bank of America announced its
policy, it issued a statement that it would be dropping the fees. Its
major competitors, all of which had announced plans to charge simi-
lar fees, promptly followed suit.12 6
Both of these examples are instances of what might have been
class actions: a wrong committed against a large number of people for
a relatively small amount of money. No lawyer would ever take an
individual's case in such an instance, and aggregation would be the
only way to have recourse. Using the Internet and social networking,
consumers were able to pressure a "settlement" that resulted in the
offending firms changing their behavior before the harm had even
taken effect.
How often would such an approach work? While it is difficult to
know, it is unlikely that such processes have the consistency and pre-
dictability to replace collective litigation altogether (although it may
obviate the need for some actions).127 At the very least, these dynam-
ics must be taken into account when one considers the role of collec-
tive litigation, particularly in the consumer context.
123. Ann Carrns, Petition on Debit Card Fee Attracts 200,000 Supporters, N.Y.
TiMEs BucKs BLOG (Oct. 13, 2011), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/peti-
tion-on-debit-card-fee-attracts-200000-supporters/.
124. The Woman Behind the Bank of America Fee Protest, CBS NEWS (Nov. 2,
2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500202_162-20128896/the-woman-behind-the-
bank-of-america-fee-protest.
125. Bruce Horovitz, Bank of America Fee Retraction Shows Effect of Consumer
Rage, USA TODAY (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/
story/2011-11-01/consumer-backlashI51032364/1.
126. See id.
127. However, it might be argued that such alternative means of resolving mass
disputes could weigh against class certification, at least in Rule 23(b)(3) actions,
where superiority must be satisfied. See Eric P. Voigt, A Company's Voluntary Refund
Program for Consumer's Can Be a Fair and Efficient Alternative to a Class Action, 31
REV. LITIG. 617, 618-21 (2012) (arguing that the superiority requirement of Rule
23(b)(3) actions could mean that voluntary compensation programs instituted by de-
fendants could preclude certification of a class).
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4. Web 2.0 Dispute Resolution Within the Legal System From
the Bottom Up - the AT&T "Throttling" Dispute
Another dispute that became an Internet phenomenon involved
AT&T's wireless 3G Internet service. In late 2011, AT&T announced
that it would begin to limit data usage for high volume users of its so-
called "unlimited" data plans. The level of the cap was unspecified,
unlike the caps of other carriers whose policies were less discretion-
ary. AT&T was only clear that the top five percent of users on unlim-
ited plans would be subject to the practice. While the company
claimed that this would not affect most consumers, subscribers were
nonetheless outraged by the idea that an "unlimited" plan would be
suddenly subject to such caps.128 The Internet uproar prompted one
user, Matt Spaccarell, to bring action in court.129 Since a class action
was not a possibility after the Concepcion decision, which upheld
AT&T's pre-dispute arbitration clause effectively precluding any kind
of collective proceeding, Mr. Spaccarell's only option was arbitration
or small claims court. He decided to pursue his claim in small claims
court where he won and was awarded the $850 for the difference in
fee he would have paid for the no-longer-quite-so-unlimited plan.
AT&T's initial reaction was to threaten to appeal the judgment un-
less Mr. Spaccarell accepted a settlement that contained a promise of
confidentiality about the outcome of the suit.'3 0 Mr. Spaccarell re-
fused, and instead created a webpage devoted to giving other sub-
scribers the tools to bring their own suits. His story went viral, and
shortly thereafter, AT&T backed down from its threats to appeal and
issued a statement "clarifying" its throttling policy, setting a defined
amount of data at which it would begin to limit data usage.
This example, a putative class action in a post-Concepcion world,
also illustrates how the typical power equation in small-value litiga-
tion might be turned on its head. No class action was available to the
plaintiff, yet some, albeit small, systemic change was accomplished.
And an individual plaintiff was able to effectively intimidate a large
corporation into dropping its appeal and making even a slight molli-
fying gesture despite its apparent belief that it had done nothing
128. Peter Svensson, AT&T Customers Surprised by Data Speed Limits, USA To.
DAY (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-02-13/atampt-
data-slowdown/53071798/1.
129. Mark Raby, AT&T Fires Back at Data Throttling Lawsuit, TG DAILY (Mar.
14, 2012), http/www.tgdaily.com/mobility-briefl62071-att-fires-back-at-data-throt-
tling-lawsuit; Dan Graziano, iPhone User Who Sued AT&T Receives New Settlement
Offer, BGR (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.bgr.com/2012/03/13/iphone-user-who-sued-
att-receives-new-settlement-offer/.
130. See Graziano, supra note 129.
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wrong. Functionally speaking, this outeome mimics n non-mnrietary
settlement of what could have been a class action claim.
5. Web 2.0 Dispute Resolution Within the Legal System From
the Top Down - The Honda Hybrid Civic Class
Action
Within the context of class litigation, social networking has
demonstrated an ability to enhance participation by plaintiffs, facili-
tate greater sorting among them and expression of interests, as well
as develop alternative means of bringing litigation outside the class.
However, it has also created problems for courts trying to manage
and control mass litigation. The example from the introduction is il-
lustrative. The carmaker Honda proposed a settlement in early 2012
to class members in a lawsuit involving deceptive marketing prac-
tices for its hybrid Civic. 13 1 One class member, Heather Peters, re-
jected the settlement of $100-200 and a discount on a new car.
Instead she brought an action in small claims court, where she was
awarded $9867.132 Media attention on the victory and a website
started by the plaintiff spread awareness of the settlement and
caused several state attorneys general to announce plans to object to
the proposed settlement on fairness grounds.' 33 Ms. Peters added
documents to her website that individuals could use to bring small
claims actions on their own.' 34 As a result, the court allowed class
members more time to consider their options, and a larger number of
people opted out, ultimately totaling 1708 people out of a class of
200,000. Those who opted out reported a variety of motives for doing
so. Some stated that they wanted to attempt to get more money from
small claims court. A group led by Ms. Peters began a separate class
action suit. 3 5 Others objected to the high attorneys' fees, while
131. See True v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. Cal
2010); see also Winter, supra note 14.
132. See True v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. Cal
2010); see also Winter, supra note 14.
133. Chris Woodyard, Five States Weigh Joining Honda Gas-Mileage Class Action,
USA TODAY (Feb. 15, 2012), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/driveon/post/
2012/02/five-states-weigh-joining-honda-gas-mileage-class-action/l.
134. Peters, supra note 17.
135. See Adam Zimmerman, Flash Mob Litigation, PRAWFsBLAWG (Jan. 3, 2012,
9:33 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/20l2/01/class-actions-v-flash-
mob-litigation.html (discussing a case in which a large number of plaintiffs opted out
of a class action lawsuit and attempted to form a separate action through self-moti-
vated aggregation).
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others opted out because they were happy with the performance of
the car and objected to the idea of the suit altogether.136
This example illustrates how Internet-based networking can fa-
cilitate participation and expression of autonomy in class actions, and
enhance the power of objectors, in ways which have previously been
much more difficult to accomplish. In the example one objector was
able significantly to impact a class action lawsuit despite procedural
obstacles because she could communicate and network with other
class members. While Ms. Peters' actions did not ultimately affect the
fairness determination of the judge, 37 it raised the attention of a
number of state attorneys general who considered intervening, ad-
ding to all the objecting plaintiffs' bargaining power. The example
also illustrates how an objection can raise awareness of some class
members who might not have otherwise known about the suit, in-
cluding those who did not want to be part of the suit in the first place.
The ultimate number of opt-outs was small relative to the class size,
but the example nonetheless illustrates how greater information
about the case can lead to better sorting and communication of indi-
vidual litigant preferences and potentially greater exercise of opt-out
rights.
As these examples point out, social networks can be empowering
for group litigants, but they also have drawbacks and raise difficult
issues for judges trying to manage litigation and for legal system's
ability to provide predictability in the dispute resolution process. The
class action against a McDonald's restaurant franchise in Michigan
in 2013 provides an illustration. The action was brought alleging the
use of non-hallal meat in purportedly hallal food in an area of south-
eastern Michigan, which is home to a large Muslim community. A
proposed settlement was announced that would award significant
sums to the class counsel and representative, but nothing to the class
members.s38 Instead of being distributed to plaintiffs, the money
would be donated to a local charity. In response, a small group of
plaintiffs created a Facebook page to raise awareness and try to per-
suade less-informed members of the class to opt out of what the page
136. Elliot Spagat, Judge in California OKs Honda Mileage Settlement, YAHOO!
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/judge-california-oks-honda-mileage-set-
tlement-001321456.html.
137. Ms. Peters's victory was reversed on appeal. See Heather Peters v. Honda
American Motors Co. Inc., Case No. 11S002156 (Super. Ct. Cal. 2012). Honda had
litigated six small claims cases and had lost only one. See id.
138. Fisher, supra note 64.
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argued was an unfair settlement. The judge issued an injunction or-
dering the plaintiffs to remove the Facebook page, stating that only
the court could provide notice and instructions for opt-out, and that
any competing source of such information could be misleading and
cause confusion. This example highlights both the potential for the
Internet to give voice to members of a plaintiff class as well as a
broader religious and cultural community directly affected by the
class litigation. It also shows how social networking can create com-
plications for a judge attempting to mange litigation. 1 3 9
C. New Media-Based Dispute Resolution and Its Implications for
Formal Litigation Processes
While Twitter, social media, and Internet-based collective dis-
pute resolution may not provide a substitute for court-based actions,
they are changing collective and individual interaction in ways that
make class action governance structures seem anachronistic. Mem-
bers of the bench and the academy have made similar observations
and called for greater democratization of class processes, in some
cases highlighting the potential of the Internet and other communica-
tion modalities to facilitate greater participation.14 0 Technology could
go even further to improve class actions than what has been done to
date. The examples in this Part provide a starting point for consider-
ing how this might be done. But changing class action to engage with
large numbers of individuals might cause upheaval in time-tested
processes by introducing practices that are unfamiliar to the legal
system. That type of change and experimentation is at odds with a
system that ordinarily changes slowly, dealing with reform retrospec-
tively, and with the benefit of hindsight. Nonetheless, concerns for
democracy, due process, and procedural justice provide compelling
reasons to avoid complacency and explore ways to improve the cur-
rent system in line with technological possibilities, as further elabo-
rated in the subparts below.
139. After several public volleys, and an attempt by Public Citizen to intervene,
lawyers for the plaintiffs and the defendant persuaded the judge to lift the injunction.
See McDonald's Drops Halal Items from U.S. Menu After Problems in Dearborn, DE-
TROIT FREE PREss (June 24, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article/20130624/NEWS02/
306240012/McDonald-s-halal-stop-Dearborn.
140. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, Mark Herrmann & Bradley W. Harrison, Making
Class Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. Prrr. L. REV. 727
(2007); Jack Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45
CoLum. J. L. & Soc. PaoBs. 451 (2012).
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1. Alignment with Democratic Norms and Due Process
Individual autonomy and self-determination are core democratic
values, and designing procedures that recognize their fundamental
role should be a primary goal of any system designer.141 Allowing in-
dividuals to take greater part in adjudication of collective claims
would fit more squarely with the democratic values underlying the
American legal system. It would also arguably better satisfy norms of
due process as they are understood to operate in litigation.142
Class action governance is representative, but not democratic in
two basic respects.143 First, the procedure works to deprive those
with claims from having any material input into how the claims are
resolved, as has been described in Part II. Second, class actions un-
dermine democratic norms by taking disputes that often involve huge
swaths of society and deal with issues that would benefit from com-
munity input and depriving all but a few unaccountable individuals
of the power to decide them. The result is that existing procedure has
the potential to over-simplify large public disputes by eliding differ-
ences between disputants, masking a complex array of sub-conflicts,
and attempting to deal with them in ways that circumvent demo-
cratic processes that would more appropriately address them.
American democracy espouses a normative commitment to indi-
vidual autonomy and self-determination. Autonomy has been de-
scribed as important in the legal system for a number reasons: to
141. Cf Redish & Larsen, supra note 68, at 1574 ("The individual's autonomy to
advance his interests in the manner he deems most advisable through resort to gov-
ernmental processes - either political or judicial - grows out of the precepts of lib-
eral democratic theory that appropriately underlie our nation's normative
commitment to self-determination and individual rights."). See also Bone, Puzzling
Idea, supra note 75, at 578 ("Guaranteeing a personal day in court is partly about
outcome quality, but what makes the day-in-court right such a problem for the class
action is its connection to process-based values, such as legitimacy and respect for the
dignity of individual litigants. Any normative account of adequate representation,
therefore, must explain how representation can substitute for a personal day in court
and satisfy process-based values.").
142. I recognize that the concepts of "democracy" and "due process," while related,
are distinct. Each covers a vast territory and a full discussion of how either idea re-
lates to class actions could fill many articles. For the sake of simplicity and economy
of space, this discussion deals with them in a relatively summary discussion that can-
not hope to completely do these concepts justice. However, a complete treatment of
these topics is not necessary to comprehend the basic arguments in this Part with
respect to either.
143. See Redish & Larsen, supra note 68, at 1574.
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validate the intrinsic dienitv and respect of individualsl44 to en-
hance the legitimacy of governmental involvement in a dispute,145 to
improve the instrumental ends of the law,146 and to provide means
for educating and informing those affected by decisions about a dis-
pute and its remedy.147 Autonomy and self-determination with re-
spect to one's legal rights are in turn understood to be manifest
through the ability to make decisions about the dispositions of those
rights.s48 As Professors Redish and Larsen have argued, the ability
to make such decisions is presumably protected by the Constitution's
Due Process Clauses,149 which have been construed to mean that an
individual's legal rights cannot be adjudicated without giving that
person the ability to participate by way of having a day in court.' 50
144. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IowA L. REV., 965,
968 (1993) [hereinafter Allure]; Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 271 (1991) [hereinafter Conceiving].
145. Cf. Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IowA L. REV. 981, 996
(1993) [hereinafter Promise].
146. See e.g., Fiss, Allure, supra note 144, at 965; Conceiving, supra note 144, at
271. Professor Farina suggests that participation by individuals in an interactive ex-
change with the court in which "knowledge, desires and values are created" serves
both instrumental and intrinsic values because "[ilf knowledge is situated in context
and contingent upon perspective, then a decisionmaker cannot learn to use her power
wisely unless she listens to those who are affected by her decisions." Id.
147. Cf. Sturm, Promise, supra note 145, at 997.
148. See id. at 1581 ("At its definitional core, democratic theory is grounded in a
societal commitment to the notion of self-determination.").
149. See U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
150. See Redish and Larsen, supra note 68, at 1573 ("Because the Constitution's
Due Process Clauses are generally construed to assure that an individual's legally
protected rights cannot be adjudicated without providing her with a day in court,
there would seem to exist at least a prima facie conflict between the dictates of proce-
dural due process and the collectivist goals of the class action procedure."); Lawrence
H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10-7, at 666-67 (2d ed. 1988) (distin-
guishing instrumental from intrinsic values of participation and associating the latter
with respect for persons); Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell,
Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Represen-
tation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1893-94 (anchoring the day-in-court
ideal in a process-based theory of democratic legitimacy); Lawrence B. Solum, Proce-
dural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 275-84 (2004) (arguing that "a right of partici-
pation is essential for the legitimacy of a final and binding civil proceeding," id. at
275). It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court has indicated on occasion that
procedural due process protects process-based - not just outcome-based - values.
See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 261-62 (1978); see also Steven T.O. Cottreau, Note, The Due Process Right to Opt
Out of Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 480 (1998) (arguing that non-opt out class
actions are violations of due process rights).
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Thus, the basis of the Due Process guarantees are rooted in the cen-
trality of autonomy rights to democratic theory.151
Even if one accepts that autonomy is important, however, it does
not follow that autonomy can never be limited or curtailed when jus-
tifications exist for doing so, and procedural protection are put into
place. In class actions, both justifications and procedural protections
are advanced to rationalize depriving plaintiffs of the usual right to
participate in the adjudication of their claims. The justification part
of the rationale for plaintiff disenfranchisement in class actions (and
by association other types of aggregate litigation) is the lack of a via-
ble alternative model.152 There are many important reasons to pro-
vide a viable route for mass litigation, including providing
compensation to victims and creating deterrents against widespread
harms. 53 But doing so has been assumed to require minimizing the
importance of autonomy when dealing with groups. 154 As it has been
described in the context of mass tort class actions, "the choice is not
so much between two workable models [of mass litigation] as between
151. For an explanation of how autonomy forms a central part of the due process
calculus in a class action, see Redish and Larsen supra note 68, at 1578 ("It is, ulti-
mately, the interest in self-determination and individual control that must stand, at
the very least, as the presumptive normative foundation of procedural due process.");
see also id. at 1582 ("The procedural due process guarantee is appropriately viewed as
a constitutional outgrowth of democracy's normative commitment to such process-
based political autonomy."). For a more general discussion of liberal political theory's
commitment to individual autonomy, see generally Martin H. Redish & Clifford W.
Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 753 (2007).
152. See Shapiro, The Class, supra note 32, at 933-34 ("A related point bears on
the question of individual choice and autonomy. Limits not only on individual re-
sources, but on public resources as well may mean that the possibility of litigation by
each victim of a mass tort, leading to a reasonably prompt disposition of each such
case, represents more a dream than a reality for many members of the class."); see
also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van
Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)) ("The policy at the very core of the
class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not pro-
vide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights.'"); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985)
153. See William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation: A Positive Externalities
Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709 (2005); William B.
Rubenstein, On What a Private Attorney General Is - and Why It Matters, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 2127 (2004); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a
Public Good, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 2517 (2008).
154. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN Fiss & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE Viii
(1988) (questioning the sensibility of "traditions of individuality and autonomy" that
shape how we understand parties to legal disputes "in a world full of injuries suffered
by groups - users of desecrated environments, consumers of illegally priced goods,
patients confined to hospitals that provide no care").
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a model that offers some hope of a reasonably prompt and fair dispo-
sition and one that does not."' 55
However, as the examples in this Part illustrate, another worka-
ble model is now possible. Participatory online endeavors provide
possible means for both enhancing democracy and allowing for en-
gagement of different points along the spectrum between the individ-
ual and the entity, even where very large and dispersed groups of
people are concerned. Examples of such endeavors illustrate how
even when dealing with large numbers, procedures could be better
aligned with the ideal of participation and the self-determination
value it is meant to vindicate.156
With regard to the procedural rationales behind class actions,
most explanations focus on the role of the class representative and, in
some instances, the ability of plaintiffs to opt out.' 5 7 The prevailing
theories rationalizing representative litigation conclude that ade-
quate representation of class members - and full litigation of their
claims - is sufficient to bind the class to a judgment and preclude
future litigation. 158 While there is no consensus as to the correct the-
oretical justification,15 9 a great deal of energy has been devoted to
formulating the precise rationale or why this is so, and scholars differ
as to what it should be. To summarize briefly, some proceduralists
take an outcome-focused view: that preclusion is appropriate because
the representative can fairly address absent class members' interests
and thereby ensure a socially optimal outcome for all of them.160
Others take a more process-oriented view: that the legitimacy of ad-
judicative outcomes stems from the ability to adequately participate
in the process and that the preclusive effect stems from the represen-
tative's interests being so closely aligned with the represented parties
155. Id. at 934.
156. Cf Sturm, Promise, supra note 145, at 998 (making a parallel point in the
context of structural injunctions that "a central challenge confronting theorists and
practitioners [is] how to recognize and respect the dignity and diversity of individual
group members and yet acknowledge commonalities in perspective, status, and inter-
ests. Most process theorists treat autonomy and dignity as pertaining solely to the
individual. When individuals are defined in relation to groups, autonomy concerns
disappear. This analysis distorts the nature of the relationship between individuals
and groups and the role of group membership in defining and preserving individuals'
autonomy and sense of self.").
157. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representa-
tion, 82 TEx. L. REv. 287, 288-90 (2003).
158. See Bone, supra note 9, at 203-18 (exploring the tension between the day-in-
court right and the theory of virtual representation, and discussing various attempts
to justify the tension).
159. See Bone, Puzzling Idea, supra note 75, at 624.
160. See Bone, supra note 9, at 216-18.
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that his or her participation satisfies this value as if those parties
were present themselves. 161 Others take a hybrid approach, arguing
that the procedure is designed to satisfy both outcome-focused and
procedural values where and when it can.162
These explanations each suffer from similar flaws. The outcome-
based view is problematic for a few reasons. First, because class ac-
tion outcomes are ultimately negotiated in most cases and rarely liti-
gated, and because the representative is rarely very involved in those
negotiations, it is difficult to see how their participation could ensure
the best outcome. Second, the "correctness" of an outcome has subjec-
tive as well as objective components, and it can be difficult to say
with certainty that the correct outcome is reached without asking
those affected by it. Even if one assumes that an objectively optimal
outcome can be determined (for example, by reference to monetary
distribution), whether or not an optimal outcome is reached is an em-
pirical question, the answer to which cannot be assumed. Moreover,
it has been suggested as an empirical matter that, even assuming a
faithful representative, litigants get better outcomes outside of the
class action than they would in representative litigation. 163
The process-based view also is also questionable because the rep-
resentative does not usually participate in the negotiations that con-
stitute the majority of the process in class litigation. In addition, even
if the representative does participate, it is questionable that any rep-
resentative's interest would be so closely aligned with those of other
class members as to be an effective substitute for them. The interests
of the representative may diverge with those of class members be-
cause of simple divergence of preferences with respect to various ap-
proaches and decisions to be taken. This has been observed and
documented in a number of instances. 164 Since negotiated settle-
ment, and not legal adjudication, often determines the outcome of the
action, simply possessing similar legal entitlements is not sufficient
to presume similarity of interests in the action. Moreover, in the
course of an action, internal divergence may appear between mem-
bers of the class that are difficult for a representative to adequately
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See Coffee, supra note 92, at 407 (discussing a recent study of securities class
actions in which the largest institutional shareholders were chosen as class
representatives).
164. See, e.g., Tamara Relis, It's Not About the Money: A Theory of Misconceptions
of Plaintiffs' Litigation Aims, 68 U. Prrr. L. REv. 701, 701-04 (2006). .
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speak to.16 5 The hybrid explanations are vulnerable to critiques of
both outcome- and process- based explanations.
All of these explanations also depart fundamentally from typical
democratic methods by which representatives are selected. Instead of
any sort of choice by those whose rights will be determined, as is the
typical democratic paradigm, the representative in class actions is
chosen and constrained paternalistically by the court and class coun-
sel. The right to opt out of an action, which exists for class members
in Rule 23(b)(3) class action where monetary damages are sought, is
sometimes seen as remedying this problem. If a class member does
not like the representative or any of the choices being made on his or
her behalf, he or she has the option to leave the suit. However, opting
out is an extreme substitute for basic democratic mechanisms such as
being able to interface with or choose a representative, voice one' own
concerns, or have one's lawyers take one's interests seriously in a set-
tlement negotiation. The existing level of choice stands in tension
with democratic ideals as well as the principles that underlie most
types of litigation.166
Moreover, the existence of the various rationalizations for repre-
sentative litigation is noteworthy in the sense that they demonstrate
the discomfort with the procedural treatment of individual class
members and struggle to explain how this treatment is consistent
with the court system's underlying values. The different explanations
for why existing procedure adequately protects due process rights ef-
fectively collapse back into the justification for having representative
litigation in the first place: the lack of a viable alternative. But if the
165. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (decertify-
ing a settlement class under Rule 23(b)(3) on the grounds that certain members of the
class - future claimants - had inherently different interests than present claimants
and therefore could not form part of the same class nor be represented by the same
counsel).
166. See Redish and Larsen, supra note 68, at 1574 ("No one could reasonably
doubt this autonomy principle in the political realm: Government may not paternalis-
tically choose a candidate to support on behalf of a citizen; nor may it determine for an
individual what he will and will not say on behalf of his political positions. Govern-
mentally imposed paternalism should be no less acceptable when it comes to the indi-
vidual's ability to resort to the judicial process in order to protect his interests."). But
see Bone, Puzzling Idea, supra note 75, at 624 ("[Tlhe day-in-court right is best under-
stood as a right to control litigation insofar as relevant institutional considerations
support personal control. It is a right insofar as it resists or constrains reasons for
limiting control that sound exclusively in improving aggregate welfare or achieving
collective social goals. But it does not guarantee a zone of relatively unfettered free-
dom. Litigation is not a field where adversaries engage in unrestrained combat. Liti-
gation is the way adjudication accomplishes its goals, and the public goals of
adjudication shape the procedural rights litigants possess.").
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fundamental explanation is, "this is the best we can do," then it
stands to reason that we should push the boundaries of what our
"best" is.
In addition, the larger the number of people involved in a litiga-
tion, the more that even "private" litigation becomes effectively like
public litigation. The court's decisions affect more than just the liti-
gants before the court; societal norms are implicated, and societal
buy-in may be needed to ensure compliance with the result. The
court's decisions come to resemble something akin to legislative or
regulatory processes of the type that usually involve opportunities for
input from the public. 167 Moreover, since trial is rare in large class
actions, the usual process for obtaining public input - the jury - is
absent. Although trials and juries are rarely seen in class actions, it
is no less true that "many legal norms need community input for the
decisions applying them to be accepted by that community. Issues
such as negligence, intentional discrimination, material breach of
contract, and unfair competition are not facts capable of scientific
demonstration. Nor are these issues pure questions of law." 1 6 8 This is
particularly true when class actions involve such large classes of
plaintiffs that they have repercussions for society as a whole. For this
reason, there have been a number of calls for an expanded approach
to democratic participation in mass litigation. 169
An argument can be made that allowing greater participation
would make no practical difference with respect to litigants' auton-
omy because class members do not and would not exercise any real
control in litigation anyway. Nonetheless, whether individuals use a
right or not is not relevant to whether the right exists or whether
avenues for pursuing it should be provided.170 The values that under-
lie our democratic system militate that any possibility of enhancing
167. See Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICHIGAN
LAW REVIEw 899, 899-910 (1996).
168. Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restor-
ing a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401 (2011).
169. Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute
Resolution, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 511, 511-20 (2013); Judith Resnik, Compared to
What?, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 636, 693-95 (2011.
170. MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASs ACTION LAWSUIT 143 (2009) ("It might be argued that the
concern with the need to preserve litigant autonomy is greatly overdone, because as a
practical matter a litigant will influence day-to-day strategic litigation choices, at
most, only rarely. Instead, it is the litigant's chosen representative, far more than the
litigant herself, who makes such decisions. Thus, the argument might proceed, to take
those choices away from the litigant would actually undermine litigant autonomy
very little. While of course there is much practical truth in the insight, it would be a
serious mistake, from the perspective of liberal democratic thought, to glean from the
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individual participation, while maintaining the workability of the
system, should be implemented. Moreover, with trial becoming a rare
species, greater participation restores a democratic feature of the sys-
tem that the absence of trial removes - the input of the community
in the shaping of legal norms and rules.171
2. Procedural Justice
Procedural justice concerns also suggest that incorporating more
participatory framework into class processes is warranted. Procedu-
ral justice research examines litigants' preferences regarding system
design, including what features produce greater satisfaction and
greater durability in outcomes, as well as what characteristics lead to
greater legitimacy of the system.172 This research suggests that, in
an adjudication context, litigants experience more satisfying and du-
rable outcomes under primarily three conditions, none of which turn
on the actual outcome but instead on what process was followed:
(1) where a matter is decided in an adversary system involving an
impartial third party decision-maker constrained by mechanisms for
error correction, such as appellate review and new trials; (2) either
established and consistent court rules applied equally to all partici-
pants or the opportunity to participate in designing dispute resolu-
tion procedures themselves; and (3) the opportunity to be heard and
to participate in the adjudicatory or deliberation process.' 73 Concern
absence of such direct litigant involvement in strategic decision making a finding that
the values of individual autonomy embodied in the due process clause are therefore
irrelevant in the context of litigation control.").
171. See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 168, at 400 ("[T]he citizenry at large, act-
ing through jury representatives, decides what the community deems acceptable. In
addition, a public trial reminds the decision maker - judge or jury - that the lives of
real human beings may be deeply affected by the decision.").
172. See generally E. AuLN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); see also Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Pro-
cedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. Comp. L.
871, 889-90 (1997); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice
and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAw & Soc'Y Rev. 513, 517
(2003).
173. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 172, at v ("Although winners were more satis-
fied with their experiences than losers, the litigants' satisfaction with their exper-
iences had less to do with actual case outcomes, costs, and delay than with how the
litigants' experiences with the system compared with their expectations."); Judith
Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate:
Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 306 (1996) ("[Tort
litigants share judicial and legal theorists' beliefs that process matters."); Tom R.
Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAw
65, 68 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) ("While lawyers and judges
often think that people's reactions to their experiences are driven by whether or not
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for procedural justice is in part what animates the idea that each in-
dividual should have his or her own day-in-court - a right that has
been found to be present even alongside the availability of represen-
tative adjudication.17 4
To be sure, the class action is an adjudicative process subject to
error correction; however, as previously noted, it seldom bears out all
of the features of adjudication, ending more often in negotiated settle-
ment than in decisions on the law and facts.175 This weakens the
traditional procedural justice benefits of trial by removing the third-
party decision maker from much of the process and diminishing the
impact of court rules.176 Thus, procedural justice requires a greater
emphasis on those other procedural components that confer satisfac-
tion on the parties: greater participation, the ability to be heard, and
the opportunity to take part in designing the process themselves.
One objection to this line of reasoning is that having control in a
class action does not matter much to plaintiffs, since in most types of
litigation the plaintiff has little control over the process and in fact
would rather delegate most responsibility to the lawyers.' 77 Procedu-
ral justice is highly context dependent, and disputants' expectations
they 'win' their case, that position is not supported by empirical research on disput-
ing."); Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of
Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAw & Soc'v REV. 51, 69-70 (1984). For a helpful
summary and discussion of procedural justice research, see Burch, supra note 35, at
29-43.
174. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (citing the deep-
rooted day-in-court right tradition as the basis for the broad rule against nonparty
preclusion); Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (stating that,
as a result of the historic day-in-court right, a judgment among parties does not gen-
erally bind strangers to the lawsuit); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989)
(recognizing that the day-in-court right is ingrained in the Court's preclusion
jurisprudence).
175. See Rubenstein, Transaction Model, supra note 21, at 371-77; Marc Galanter,
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004); see also Burbank & Subrin,
supra note 168, at 399-402 (noting the decline in trials).
176. See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 168, at 401 ("Without the realistic possi-
bility of a trial, settlements in large measure reflect and discount the costs of discov-
ery and trial. As a result, some plaintiffs receive less than the value of their cases if
tried on the merits, while some defendants settle non-meritorious cases in order to
avoid transaction costs.").
177. See Bone, Puzzling Idea, supra note 75, at 602, 617 ("Parties, after all, seldom
exercise much personal control over litigation and glean little satisfaction from adver-
sarial participation for its own sake, independent of outcome . . . More generally,
there is no sharp distinction between being a party with little actual control and being
an absentee with none. As the amount of a party's control diminishes, it becomes
increasingly difficult to distinguish a party from a nonparty as far as process-based
participation is concerned. Indeed, a party with vanishingly little control is not in a
significantly different normative position than an absentee with no control at all.").
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of what sort of process they should be afforded plays a large role in
their satisfaction. The reasoning is that if the parties do not expect a
great deal of control, then an absence of control will not affect their
perception of the process or the outcome.
A problem with this argument is that it assumes static expecta-
tions on the part of disputants. As already noted, changes in what is
possible in the context of litigation have already been seen, and there
is no reason to expect parties' perception of their role in mass litiga-
tion to remain detached from the realities of what is possible. The
historical practice of denying individuals a participation right, when
participation is easily possible, is likely to appear less legitimate over
time.
It could be argued that the level of participation needed to satisfy
procedural justice concerns can be far less involved than having one's
full day in court.178 This paper does not suggest that participation
must be calibrated precisely to a certain level that would satisfy a
procedural justice interest, since finding the correct level of participa-
tion an individual would need to feel satisfied ultimately requires em-
pirical analysis and would vary depending on circumstances. Nor
does this analysis contend that individuals need a comprehensive
participation right in every element of the dispute resolution process.
However, the "correct" amount of control and participation can be ap-
proximated by disputants' reactions when it is absent. The Honda
and McDonald's examples above illustrate how class members can
become angry when disenfranchised from participation in decisions
involving them. This is true even when, as in the McDonald's exam-
ple, the class members had no reasonable expectation of receiving
any individual payouts for their claims because of the large numbers
of potential claimants and the difficulties of providing receipts or
other proof of claims. Despite the lack of any real pecuniary interest,
many class members demonstrated a strong desire to influence how
the settlement monies were spent.
For these reasons, the procedural justice argument presses for
allowing a greater degree of participation, as far as can be accom-
plished with available technology, as opposed to maintaining a status
quo that is based on older ideas of what is possible. Procedural justice
may have been satisfied to a degree when the system was doing the
best it could and potential claimants had little or no knowledge of the
178. See id. at 602 ("To be sure, the procedural justice literature shows that losing
parties feel better about the process and the result when they have a chance to par-
ticipate, but the level of participation that produces these positive psychological ef-
fects falls far short of the robust control guaranteed by a broad day-in-court right.").
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process or expectation of participating in it. However, when it could
clearly do more, the system risks undermining itself by failing to find
ways to do so.
3. Inevitability
One final reason for re-thinking class actions is the fact that, ab-
sent any proactive effort to accommodate social networking technol-
ogy in the litigation system, such technology will continue to
insinuate itself in ways that may thwart the goals of existing
processes. The examples discussed in this Part demonstrate how this
could occur. The Honda and McDonald's examples demonstrate how
social media can force judges and parties to the litigation to deal with
other interested parties. The AT&T and Bank of America examples
illustrate how large groups of aggrieved individuals can wield deci-
sive influence in a dispute, whether or not the dispute is tethered to
legal claims. The type of sentiment seen in those examples can easily
be inflamed if interested individuals are kept out of the process. In
the context of a legal claim, it is easy to imagine how excluding large
numbers of plaintiffs (and potentially others) from any formal role in
a dispute resolution process could effectively undermine that process
by encouraging online mobilization aimed at influencing the defend-
ants or the court or both. Outside of legal claims, it is easy to see how
large groups could become like vigilantes, overtaking the traditional
role of the courts in enforcing their view of social norms. Courts can
no longer ignore the impact of technology-mediated communication
on collective dispute processes. Although the legal system is tradi-
tionally slow to respond to change and maintains a norm of incremen-
tal, backward looking change, by refusing to take an active role in
shaping how social media will impact litigation, the system would be
passing up an opportunity to shape the use of technology in ways that
would help achieve its ends. By taking a wait-and-see approach, the
court system risks allowing itself to be carried away by the currents
of technology and losing the ability to keep control of its processes.
IV. CLASs ACTIONS, MASS DISPUTES, AND SYSTEMs DESIGN
In the social networking space, collectivization need not be incon-
sistent with the promotion of individual interests or the fulfillment of
democratic and procedural values. But even if one is persuaded of the
importance of incorporating new means of participation and more ex-
pansive concepts of groups into class action procedures, many ques-
tions remain about how to accomplish this. While it would be difficult
to address every question in the scope of this article, I nonetheless
[Vol. 19:213264
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attempt to provide a basic framework for procedural reforms that
would begin to address the issues raised by technological innovation.
In the effort to formulate prescriptions, the study of DSD is particu-
larly useful. Practitioners and scholars of what has become known as
DSD offer guidance for how disputing processes can be successfully
employed to preserve individual voice while simultaneously recogniz-
ing group interests. These experiences are increasingly shaping the
practice of mass dispute resolution processes, including class actions.
These processes have begun to demonstrate the potential for proce-
dure to account for "individuals within [an] aggregate"'79 and differ-
ent subgroups of common interest within a class.
Moving from a model where the class is an entity governed by
outside surrogates to one that recognizes a spectrum between the en-
tity and individual would require reforms along a number of dimen-
sions. First, given that groups of disputants can sometimes form on
their own and resolve their disputes without court involvement, the
boundaries for judicial aggregation in mass disputes would have to be
re-considered. Practically speaking, this would mean re-thinking the
threshold requirements for class certification. Second, if judicial ag-
gregation is warranted a new balance between representation and in-
dividual expression needs to be found. This would need to include
protocols for how to identify the individuals eligible to participate, to
what extent they should be involved, and whether such participation
would be restricted to formal court-controlled channels or if informal
actions would be sanctioned. This would also include new ways of en-
gaging large groups of claimants with their counsel. In that regard,
any procedure would need to retain appropriate incentives for coun-
sel to act on behalf of groups of plaintiffs. Third, allowing large-scale
participation would magnify the effects of intra-class conflict, a sec-
ondary dimension of conflict beyond the dispute with the defendant,
that would need to be managed.
These changes would involve some reform of the structure of
Rule 23 itself, but Rule changes alone would likely not be adequate to
address various types of circumstances that could arise. Instead, a
more effective process would entail an explicit recognition of the
court's power to engage in the kind of "managerial judging" that al-
ready takes place, but with certain procedural norms and boundaries
built in. This would allow courts to create ad hoc solutions with pre-
scribed baselines. Additionally, any Rule changes would need to in-
clude an overarching recognition that different sizes of class can and
179. Burch, supra note 35, at 15.
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should be handled differently. Finally, it would include a subsidy for
would-be defendants to employ monitoring and self-correction mecha-
nisms. Each of these dimensions is discussed below.
A. DSD and Application to Mass Disputes
For readers unfamiliar with DSD, a brief survey of the field and
its literature may be useful. DSD has its roots in the alternative dis-
pute resolution movement, drawing from a diverse set of disciplines
and seeking to provide a framework for designing conflict manage-
ment systems that "cut the cost of conflict."' 80 Its origins stem from
early work on multi-door courthouses,18 and resolution of systemic
disputes in the context of labor relations. This literature grew to en-
compass the study of systemic conflicts in organizations generally,182
including the idea of looking for patterns in repetitive disputes to de-
termine and fix their "root cause." This research grew to embrace new
thinking about how public institutions 83 and international organiza-
tions1 84 could devise systems to handle widespread systemic
problems. Related branches of research and practice began to emerge
180. See WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS
TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988). Measuring the "cost of conflict" and any reduc-
tion is, of course, incredibly difficult and methods are open to interpretation. As the
literature claims, however, structuring a dispute resolution system in certain ways
can reduce the recidivism of conflict and lead to greater satisfaction for all parties
involved, thus reducing the overall social costs. Id.
181. See, e.g., Frank EA Sander, The Multi-Door Courthouse, 3 BARRISTER 18
(1976).
182. See, e.g., CATHY A. COSTANTINO, CHRISTINA SICKLES-MERCHANT, DESIGNING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY OR-
GANIZATIONS (1996); Cathy A. Costantino, Second Generation Organizational Conflict
Management Systems Design: A Practitioner's Perspective on Emerging Issues, 14
HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 81 (2009).
183. See, e.g., Cathy A. Costantino, Can Private Parties "Get to the Government?"
Advice for Using ADR with Federal Agencies, 11 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 135
(1993); Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Natalie C. Fleury, There's No Place Like -Home:
Applying Dispute Systems Design Theory to Create a Foreclosure Mediation System,
11 NEV. L.J. 368 (2010).
184. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Indi-
vidual Rights in International Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 587
(1998); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution
Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697 (1999).
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concerning the resolution of public disputes 85 and consensus build-
ing,186 while research developed on resolving disputes using technol-
ogy and over the Internet. 8 7 At the same time that the study of
organizational and public conflict resolution systems was developing,
mass litigation and the problems associated with it led to a signifi-
cant amount of experimentation and scholarly study of novel mass
dispute resolution systems. In a number of high profile class action
lawsuits, judges worked with dispute resolution experts to create
more individualized ways of processing claims.188 This in turn led to
the development of fund-based compensation schemes for mass tort
situations, operating completely outside the court system.' 89 Each of
these systems offered alternative ways to deal with large number of
potential claimants with less involvement by the courts than tradi-
tional processes, but still used the "shadow of law"'90 to varying de-
grees as impetus and guidance. Taken together, these experiments
and the research they spawned led to an emerging field of study of
the design of novel dispute resolution systems to help courts and or-
ganization alike cope with disputes for which they were not equipped.
The research coming out of these experiences provides a framework
185. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democ-
racy, 5 NEv. L.J. 347 (2004).
186. See, e.g., Cathy A. Costantino, Managing Facilitation and Consensus-Build-
ing Processes: Forget the Discipline and Break the Rules, 23 NEGOT. J. 193 (2007);
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley et al., Panel Discussion: Problem-Solving Mechanisms to
Achieve Consensus: How Do We Ensure Successful Resolution?, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
205 (2008); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a
New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REv. 63 (2002).
187. See, e.g., Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Beyond Efficiency: The Transformation of
Courts Through Technology, 12 UCLA J.L. & TEcH. 1 (2008).
188. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The
New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413 (1999); Linda
S. Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund:
Fund Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 121 (2002);
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Response to Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half
Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation,
73 TEx. L. REV. 1647 (1995); Deborah R. Hensler, Glass Half Full, a Glass Half
Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation,
73 TEx. L. REV. 1587 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass Out of Mass
Torts: Relfections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute Resolution,
Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and Process, 31 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 513 (1997); see also
CPR INSTITUTE, MASS CLAIMS RESOLUTION FAcILITIES (2012).
189. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Fa-
cilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1366-67 (2005) (discussing the different types and
characteristics of claims facilities in mass tort cases, and the various authorities and
contexts that create them).
190. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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for diagnosing problems with the structure of aggregate dispute reso-
lution processes and offers some lessons drawn from experience im-
plementing such structures. The types of problems that dispute
systems have addressed bear similarities to the types of Internet-
based disputes discussed in the preceding Part, in the sense that they
have frequently involved large numbers of people with diverse sets of
interests seeking to address a common dispute. In doing so, DSD
processes have treated large groups of disputants in more nuanced
ways than the class action's historical entity model. Thus DSD pro-
vides a number of ways to think about democratizing mass disputes
and improving the structure of class actions with respect to a number
of issues.
1. Identifying and Certifying Classes
The first issue to consider is when class treatment is appropriate,
or, more generally, when court involvement is required for collectiv-
ization of claims in mass disputes. Relatedly, identifying the contours
and membership of the class becomes more complex the more individ-
uals become involved. The existing standard for deciding when class
treatment is appropriate is descriptive, based largely on the charac-
teristics of the group and the effects an adjudication would have on
them. The criteria for certification seek to determine whether plain-
tiffs and the legal issues giving rise to their claims are similar enough
to warrant adjudication in one proceeding. Providing for more plain-
tiff autonomy would effectively add an intent-based standard to the
certification calculus.
Prior to a judicial decision to aggregate, giving voice to stake-
holders might involve allowing for more stakeholder input to help de-
termine the contours of the class. It would also involve taking into
account the independent actions of groups to bring resolution to a dis-
pute. This means that if an action is brought and class treatment is
requested, a court would need to consider whether or not groups have
already formed and begun action with respect to the underlying dis-
pute, as well as whether the dispute could be effectively resolved
without court involvement.
Putative class members could be canvassed, surveyed, or "crowd-
sourced" for information that could be useful to a court in determin-
ing class cohesiveness. An example of where such an approach could
be useful can be found in the Supreme Court's Dukes decision, where
it mentions in dicta that anecdotal evidence in sufficient quantities
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could have aided in the determination commonality. A similar pro-
cess could be used to refine classes into subclasses sharing more com-
mon issues. Solicitations for plaintiff support could include methods
for comments and requests for certain types of redress; they could
also allow better sorting into classes that actually share common
complaints.
Recognizing individuality also would involve allowing earlier and
more frequent opportunities to decide whether or not to be included
in the class. Although existing procedure contains opt-out rights, the
ability to exercise those rights often come once the decision on certifi-
cation is made. As discussed further below, the certification decision
creates a significant shift in the power dynamic of the action, and
individuals may want to weigh in earlier.
A court weighing certification would also need to consider how
technology changes the bargaining dynamics between parties in the
dispute. One effect of Rule 23's claim aggregation mechanism is to
correct a power imbalance caused by resource disparities between de-
fendants who are often large, wealthy, and well organized, and plain-
tiffs who are traditionally diffuse, and whose claims are too small to
incentivize individual legal action. Resource disparities inevitably in-
fluence outcomes in the civil adjudication system, by both limiting
entry into the system and determining success once there.191 Aggre-
gation helps to neutralize resource and thus bargaining power dis-
parities by leveraging economies of scale and providing lawyers with
appropriate incentives for adjudication of the legal rights of the class
to be conducted.
However, if putative class members plaintiffs collectivize and
leverage power on their own (for example, by threatening the reputa-
tion of the company, attracting regulatory attention, or influencing
stock price), then allowing aggregation in a litigation process would
confer a double subsidy, shifting bargaining power potentially too far
191. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974); see also Terence Dunworth & Joel
Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts,
1971-1991, 21 LAw & Soc. INQuiRy 497 (1996); Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall,
"Haves" Versus "Have Nots" in State Supreme Courts: Allocating Docket Space and
Wins in Power Asymmetric Cases, 35 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 393 (2001); Gillian K. Had-
field, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98
MICH. L. REv. 953 (2000) (describing the advantage corporate plaintiffs attain
through the ability to hire better quality legal services). But see Donald Songer, Ash-
lyn Kuersten & Erin Kaheny, Why the "Haves" Don't Always Come Out Ahead: Repeat
Players Meet Amici Curiae for the Disadvantaged, 53 PoL. REs. Q. 537 (2000) (discuss-
ing situations in which the traditional power dynamic is not necessarily outcome de-
terminative, due to intervention by external parties).
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in their favor. In that event, the judge would need to consider
whether he or she could help to broker a resolution without needing
to certify a class.
Shifting power dynamics between putative plaintiffs and defend-
ants might also mean a different analysis of the superiority require-
ment for certification under Rule 23(b)(3) actions where monetary
damages are sought.192 The superiority analysis requires that pro-
ceeding as a class be superior to other available methods of dispute
resolution. The purpose of the requirement is to protect autonomy
and due process by ensuring that aggregation is truly the fairest and
most efficient way necessary to the disposition of the legal claims at
stake, lest due process be violated.' 93 It could be argued that collec-
tive action via the Internet is a superior process to court-based aggre-
gation, in that is faster, more efficient, and potentially lead to better
outcomes. A superiority inquiry, as it currently exists, could be aided
by input from potential class members about their interests in an in-
dividualized versus aggregate proceeding. Moreover, if class actions
are changed to provide for greater autonomy and better serve due
process, the calculation of what sorts of processes are actually "supe-
rior" may need to change, at least to the extent that due process and
autonomy are weighed. Ad hoc collective actions may be effective, but
they also have the potential to drown out minority voices and provide
little protection for the rights of would-be defendants. Those concerns
would need to be accounted for in the certification decision.
One risk of a more democratized approach to certification is its
potential to limit the use of class actions even further than they have
been by recent legal developments, because it would make certifica-
tion more difficult or the actions themselves overly cumbersome to
administer. Such a curtailment would be a poor result because, for
many types of widespread harms, lawyer involvement is necessary to
identify the wrong, develop evidence, and put plaintiffs on notice.
192. The factors to be considered when deciding on superiority include
(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense
of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3). See also
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615-16 (1997).
193. See Voigt, supra note 127, at 626-36. (arguing that "superiority" should be
weighed against any existing process, not only judicial ones, as the requirement was
meant to ensure fairness and efficiency); accord 7AA CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1779 (3d ed. 2005).
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However, in an age in which complainants can bring what are essen-
tially "negative value" disputes without court assistance, it is reason-
able to require that class lawsuits have at least some support from
members of the class. This is not to propose an all "opt-in" mecha-
nism for class actions. 194 A system could incorporate a threshold level
of involvement, or simply canvas a sample of the putative class to
understand their preferences on aggregation. 195
2. Means of Engaging Different Types of Groups - A Public
Dispute Model
Whether or not an action is granted certification as a formal
class action, a set of procedures would need to be developed to engage
stakeholders in large-scale litigation. The groundwork for a possible
system is already in place, as evinced by how disputants are using
new media technology. What began spontaneously on the Internet
can be channeled using processes developed in systems for voting, de-
liberative democracy, management of public disputes, and efforts to
use Internet technology to engage the public in regulatory decisions.
Instead of prescribing one process for every interaction with
plaintiffs, a range of processes would exist to capture different sizes
of class, different subgroups, and different levels of class member en-
gagement. Such systems would also make thoughtful attempts to en-
gage and educate those who would otherwise not know or care about
the process. The basic contours of how these processes might work
are described below.
a. Dialogic processes and hearings
On one end of the participatory spectrum, deliberative forums,
hearings and town-hall type meetings could be available online for
claimants who have particularly strong desires to participate.
Processes used in regulatory negotiations, particularly the emerging
system, dubbed "Regulation 2.0," are instructive starting points for
developing new processes for allowing more participation and auton-
omy in mass litigation. 196 Regulation 2.0 attempts to harness social
194. However, an opt-in system has been proposed in some countries. Italy, for
example, has adopted such a system. See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 202 (2009).
195. For example, a threshold could be determined using statistical methods, such
as those that have been advocated (and used) in addressing issues of damages. Once a
particular threshold is reached, an opt-out regime could again prevail.
196. See generally Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less:
Social Networking and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 382,
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media for eliciting the interests of stakeholders in administrative
rulemaking proceedings from a wider audience than typically gets in-
volved.197 Such endeavors provide particularly apt comparisons for
the class action context because of some of the shared characteristics
of the regulatory process and class litigation - in particular, each
involves problems that affect a large number of stakeholders and
have a large number of stakeholder interests that should ideally be
accommodated in the resolution process.198 Experiments engaging
online groups in rulemaking have admittedly met with mixed re-
sults.199 Some of the problems faced have included lack of participa-
tion,200 lack of informed decision-making, and poor quality of
382-83 (2011) [hereinafter Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less] ("Web 2.0 technolo-
gies and methods seem well suited to overcoming one of the principal barriers to
broader, better public participation in rulemaking: unawareness that a rulemaking of
interest is going on."); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Achieving the Potential: The Future
of Federal E-Rulemaking (2009), 62 ADM. LAw REV. 279 (2010).
197. See generally Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less, supra note
196; Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1001 (2010). For a
general discussion of the history of online rulemaking efforts, see Beth Simone
Noveck, The Future of Citizen Participation in the Electronic State, 1 J.L. & POL'Y FOR
INFo. Soc'Y 1 (2005); CARY COGLIANESE, E-RULEMAKING: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AND REGULATORY POLICY: NEw DIRECTIONS IN DIGITAL GOVERNMENT RESEARCH 15-18,
51-58 (REGULATORY POLICY PROGRAM, REPORT No. RPP-05, 2004), http://www.hks.
harvard.edu/m-rcbg/rpp/erulemaking/papers-reports/E.Rulemaking-Report2004.pdf;
COMM. ON THE STATUS & FUTURE OF FED. E-RULEMAKING, ACHIEVING THE POTENTIAL:
THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING 21-22 (2008), https://public.resource.org/
change.gov/ceri-report-web-version.fixed.pdf. See also E-Government Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10,
13, 31, 40, 44 U.S.C.). The Act required agencies to accept comments by electronic
means and to make available online public submissions and other materials. Id.
198. Cf. Nagareda, supra note 67 (comparing class actions to a form of administra-
tive process).
199. See Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less, supra note 196, at
382-90.
200. See id. at 382-90. For a general discussion of the problems with Internet-
based attempts to enhance participation in the rulemaking context, see Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions,
55 DUKE L.J., 893, 924-25 (2006) ("[Increased public] participation may correlate to
political mobilization, so an agency might bend to the participants' wishes even if it
did not believe that they represented the median American"); Bill Funk, The Public
Needs a Voice in Policy. But Is Involving the Public in Rulemaking a Workable Idea?,
CPRBLOG (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=
F74D5F86-B44E-2CBB-ED150 7624B63809E ("The notice-and-comment procedure of
rulemaking isn't supposed to be a political exercise."); Stuart W. Shulman, Whither
Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking, 3 J. E-Gov'T
41, 43-46 (2006) (arguing that "e-mail and cyberspace" do not necessarily foster
"widespread, technologically-driven transformation of passive citizens into thought-
ful, deliberative, and engaged actors" and describing the "brain-numbing quantity of
duplicative e-mails.").
272 [Vol. 19:213
Class Action in the Age of Twitter
comments. 201 However, those experiments have also yielded suc-
cesses, as well as valuable lessons for making systems of social net-
work participation more effective.
Experiments in the regulatory space, as well as work done on
deliberative democracy, consensus building, and resolving public dis-
putes through inclusive multilateral dialogue, are instructive here.202
These models are useful as the extent that they employ processes de-
signed to build consensus as well as effect bargains. 203 The model
could take a number of different forms depending on the size of the
groups involved and the scope of the questions. More structured, for-
mal online discussions could be set up for larger more diffuse groups.
Less formal discussions could be arranged for smaller classes, or
smaller subgroups within a class. Smaller groups could follow pre-set
rules or come up with rules of their own for how to proceed and re-
port. In either case, claimants might have a number of avenues for
providing comment, ranging from real time chat to tweeting or leav-
ing posts on blog sites. This can be done relatively easily on a com-
puter, on a smartphone, or via text message. Features allowing
participants to approve or disapprove of comments left by others
would allow more passive and efficient participation by others who do
not wish to leave messages of their own. Such mechanisms can be
similar to "liking," re-tweeting, or sharing the comment on a
Facebook page In addition to providing an easy means for partici-
pants to express opinions, approval and disapproval mechanisms
help to manage information volume by aggregating people with simi-
lar sentiments, and the possibility of being approved provides incen-
tives for individuals inclined to post comments to continue
engaging.204
Mechanisms for online discussion, commentary, and information
dissemination hold potential, but can also present many problems, as
anyone who has participated in an online discussion has observed.
First, the norms of discussion that would be appropriate in the litiga-
tion context differ significantly from the free form, unstructured na-
ture of most online discussion that most participants of a system
201, See e.g., Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less, supra note 196,
at 382-90.
202. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 360-66.
203. See Id. at 360; see also THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHEN-
SIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
204. Cf Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less, supra note 196, at
443-45 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of approval and rating mechanisms
for rulemaking commentary).
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would be accustomed to. Online discussions rarely maintain any par-
ticular standard of civility, and it is not uncommon to see inflam-
matory or abusive statements. 205 Such abusive statements can easily
beget more abusive statements, causing discussion to spiral out of
control. Second, even absent such statements, it is likely that many
comments would simply be uninformed. Complex litigation is not an
area that people are likely to understand readily, and it would be
very easy for comments to follow a race to the bottom resulting in
simple bashing of the defendants, the lawyers, or both. Third, ap-
proval and disapproval mechanisms could enhance tendencies to sim-
plify comments or post caustic or comments that contain little useful
content, but attract praise from others nonetheless. Moreover, mech-
anisms simplifying participation run the risk of oversimplifying com-
plex and important issues, perhaps even giving participants a false
overconfidence in their understanding of them.
Similar problems have been encountered in the rulemaking con-
text, and the lessons that have emerged are highly consistent with
practices used in DSD efforts like consensus building and delibera-
tive democracy. One lesson from regulatory experiments is the criti-
cal importance of well-trained facilitators to encourage discussion,
and assist in the productive discussion. 206 Facilitators can influence
the level of discussion enormously in a number of ways. First, they
can set explicit norms and ground rules for discussion. It is easy to
underestimate the importance of this step, and it is easy to imagine
that users of online systems, un-used to such strictures, would find
ground rules easy to ignore. However, ground rules play a significant
role in creating norms of interaction, even in the Web 2.0 space. They
can be recalled and referred to as a standard of behavior when com-
ments become overly agitated, unproductive, or veer off into personal
attacks. Second, skilled facilitators can help elevate the level of dis-
cussion by asking follow up questions that probe users to think more
deeply about their statements, as well as by paraphrasing and re-
framing less productive comments. This would accomplish several
things. Rephrasing, adjusted for the text-based nature of the Web 2.0
space, would help to satisfy participants' basic interest in being
heard, which is often an underlying motivation for excessively angry
commentary. Paraphrasing and asking follow up questions would
205. See, e.g., id. at 446.
206. See id. at 438; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 362 ('The key to
such processes is that they are professionally developed and managed to evolve from
the needs of the particular parties engaged and so are flexible. Also, once elaborated,
these events provide clear rules of process, as well as decision.").
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also allow the facilitator to steer the tone and content of the discus-
sion. In regulatory comment rooms for example, participants were
found to respond favorably to facilitators' requests to improve their
comments, and methods to tame individuals with overly agitated
comments usually proved successful. 207
Facilitators could also share information and correct misunder-
standings, perhaps pointing users to documents, tutorials, or online
videos when it is clear that comments reflect a poor understanding of
substantive issues. They could also provide users with a better under-
standing the legal background of a case, helping to provide the
"shadow of the law" important for users to understand their alterna-
tives.208 In this way, the facilitator can serve an educative as well as
norming function in the discussion. Where approval and disapproval
mechanisms are employed, the facilitator can use this information to
detect the kinds of comments that resonate with most participants,
and analyze where an intervention might be needed to get a discus-
sion back on track. One technique proposed in the regulatory context
is to allow facilitators to nudge participants towards better commen-
tary by starring or otherwise publicly approving comments that con-
form to discussion norms.
While facilitation can be effective at mitigating some of the in-
herent problems of social networking participation, facilitator effec-
tiveness depends on the person's skill and the appearance of
neutrality. These require training, not to mention additional person-
nel, increasing the amount of resources required to manage mass liti-
gation. Prototype artificial intelligence systems have met with
success in preliminary studies using them as facilitators in media-
tion.209 Such systems would have the advantage of reducing the re-
sources required to engage classes of plaintiffs, while also potentially
appearing more neutral and objective than a human facilitator. How-
ever, such systems are unlikely to be in widespread use in the near
future. Instead, as further discussed below, the roles of class counsel
or the class representative might be reconfigured to take on some or
all of this responsibility.
207. See, e.g., Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less, supra note 196,
at 446.
208. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 190.
209. See e.g., David Allen Larson, Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars, and the
Demise of the Human Mediator, 25 OHIO STATE J. DISPUTE RESOLtJT. 105 (2010); see
also Arno R. Lodder & John Zeleznikow, Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute
Resolution, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE 73 (Mohamed
Wahab, et al., eds. 2012), available at http-//www.mediate.com/pdf/lodder.zeleznikow.
pdf.
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Regardless of the identity of the facilitator, the desired endpoint
of discussions would need to be determined, and the scope of partici-
pants' decision making power and input would have to be made clear
to them to avoid setting undue expectations. The endpoint could be
consensus (whether defined as unanimity, majority or super-
majority), but that would not be necessary, and would likely be diffi-
cult in many cases. Nonetheless, dialogic processes could yield
proposals, recommendations, or suggestions to be voted on, or they
could simply be accumulation of information about interests or other
characteristics of the class members that would be relevant to the
legal claims. In addition, they would allow claimants to express their
views, learn about the action, and connect with others. They would
also provide courts and counsel with better information about the un-
derlying dispute and class members concerns. Even large and free-
ranging discussions with many different tweets, posts, and other in-
dicia of sentiment could be mined for trends and patterns using ex-
isting technology. This would result in "crowdsourcing" ideas to assist
lawyers and judges in crafting negotiation strategies and proposals.
Indeed, technology exists to tap into the sentiment of crowds even
outside of the context of an organized forum. This would also provide
information about large groups of outliers, indicating the appropri-
ateness of a different subclass or group altogether.
Although deliberative decision-making and consensus building
processes have limitations, they have worked outside of litigation and
outside of the online world in numerous contexts involving large-
scale disputes. For example, such processes have worked to varying
degrees for environmental issues, land use problems, strategic plan-
ning for government entities, taxation, regulations, inter-group and
intra group disputes, and political and religious reconciliations. 210
Well-constructed processes could be beneficial to class litigants as
well, by helping them to learn more about the process, giving them
spaces to air their grief and frustrations, interact with one another,
share stories, sympathize, and feel a greater sense of catharsis.211
In addition, such techniques could also be helpful in formulating
what types of default choices to offer class members. Inevitably,
many members of a class would not engage in meaningful participa-
tion. Moreover, there may still be instances where it is important for
class counsel and the courts to safeguard class members from eagerly
making choices that are objectively bad. Ordinarily, this would mean
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that when they are presented with choices, pre-selected defaults
would be enormously important, as they will tend to influence the
choices individuals make.2 12 In crafting such defaults, information
about the perspective that class members have on the issues would
help to craft decisions in appropriate ways.
In the context of such deliberative processes, questions would
need to be resolved, the details of which are beyond the scope of this
paper. For instance, what kind of decision rule (if any) would be used?
Would majority rule suffice? Would it be fair in light of the possibly
skewed nature of the participants? Would there be quorum require-
ments? How would participation be maintained over time? The an-
swers to these questions might vary depending on the size of the
class, and the decision to be taken. Some consensus-building
processes leave the development of processes and decision rules to
the participants themselves, reasoning that such approaches engen-
der greater compliance and buy-in. In large diffuse classes, agreeing
on decision rules would prove difficult, and baseline rules would need
to be established.
b. Voting systems and exit
Because the goal of the system would be to keep the cost of using
it low for claimants, simple voting mechanisms would be useful for
divining the wishes and preferences of class members, and giving
them a means for making decisions. Voting procedures would be par-
ticularly useful where classes are extremely large and diffuse, and
where baseline engagement levels are low. A voting mechanism for
discerning preferences among class members would employ ballots
containing a number of different possibilities, regarding, for instance,
a material decision such as whether or not to settle and what the
settlement would entail. It could also consist of a set of possible
needs, wants, desires, or opinions about an action to parse class mem-
ber sentiment. The user would be asked to rank order his or her pref-
erences or allocate points to indicate importance of various items.
Such systems have been useful in encouraging individuals to truth-
fully reveal their preferences and allowing analysts to discern the
strength of sentiment for various preferences. 213 Voting systems have
212. For a discussion of default rules, see Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default
Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002); Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein & John P.
Balz, Choice Architecture (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1583509.
213. See, e.g, Richard Zeckhauser, Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto
Optimality, 67 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 934, 934-40 (1973). Voting
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also been shown to increase likelihood of participation when done
well, given their relatively low cost for participants. 214
In addition, a new model of expression would situate exit as one
of a number of actions class members could take to express dissatis-
faction with a settlement, or any other action taken in the class ac-
tion process. Class members could be informed of their rights to exit,
express an opinion or desire with regard to the suit or settlement in a
nuanced way that could be addressed directly rather than indirectly
through complete rejection in toto, and, if exit indeed became the only
option, there would be opportunities to inform other class members of
defects and their opt out rights and possibly gather enough people to
exit to make alternative litigation viable.
c. Representatives and class counsel revisited
Representatives would likely still be useful in such a process, es-
pecially where classes are large and interests fractured. But a
broader view of the role and selection of those representatives would
be possible. This could mean outright election of an individual (or in-
dividuals) by class members. It could also entail processes whereby
the representative could connect with claimants to participate more
effectively in negotiations with respect to the action. The class would
thus act as a "free-form focus group." More input on how the repre-
sentative should act and what views to express would be useful in
helping to align the representative's interests more closely with those
of class members. Moreover, representatives need not be limited to
the plaintiffs' side. Defendant representative could also be used to
engage stakeholders and allow them to express their interests. This
expression would be valuable, not only allowing plaintiffs to influence
the process but giving individuals a chance to tell their stories and be
heard, an important component of a dispute system. 215
systems have also been the subject of criticism for producing inconsistent results de-
pending on small variations in how questions are asked. A large literature exists
about how to use such systems to produce accurate results. See e.g., Hannu Nurmi,
Voting Paradoxes and Referenda, 15 Soc. CHOICE WELFARE 333 (1998). The technical
details of such systems are beyond the scope of this paper.
214. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less, supra note 196, at 443
("We have, therefore, been very cautious about introducing any form of voting or
ranking into Regulation Room design - even though information science research
shows that these forms of user engagement help build online community and foster
additional participation.").
215. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 360-66 (discussing essential compo-
nent of a consensus building process). The importance of the opportunity to be heard
has also been noted in mass tort claims systems. See, e.g. KENNETH R. FEINBERG,
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Class counsel would assume a different but equally important
role in a more participatory system. Internet technology is already
changing the way that lawyers and clients interact in the class action
context. Lawyers can now use tools like blog postings and Twitter
feeds to identify patterns of small, widespread harm (such as slower
than advertised DSL speeds) that were previously imperceptible.
Lawyers currently use the Internet, Facebook, and Twitter to find
potential class members before an action is brought and to connect
class members with settlement facilities once the action is concluded.
Similarly, aggrieved individuals use blogs and consolidation websites
to aggregate on their own, and, if they desire, find a lawyer to re-
present them.216 These emerging trends demonstrate new ways to
connect lawyers and clients, connect class members with each other,
and, streamline the ways in which claimants can access settlements.
Such changes can be built upon to enhance the lawyers' role and
lessen the inherent principal-agent tension 217 between class counsel
and the class members that has been the subject of many reforms
efforts. 218 This could occur in several ways. First, an important fea-
ture of Web 2.0 regulatory systems for engaging stakeholder is infor-
mation architecture and the ability of the system to educate and
explain issue. Lawyers well trained in client counseling would be par-
ticularly suited to helping develop this architecture. In addition, pro-
viding avenues for lawyers to connect with claimants would allow
class counsel to fill an important but often missing advisory role for
members of the class, explaining the law and the action to interested
class members and helping them think about the pros and cons of any
decisions they might be asked to make. It is easy to imagine how this
could be done through a variety of interfaces, including videos, chat
discussions, or virtual Q&A facilities. In addition, the greater level of
interaction between lawyers and claimants has the potential to serve
a monitoring function by increasing general awareness of what law-
yers are doing, and providing an outlet for class members to discuss
WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF
9/11 (2005); Burch, supra note 35, at 30.
216. For example, the Internet site TopClassActions.com connects potential plain-
tiffs looking to bring suit with lawyers, and lawyers who suspect there may be poten-
tial class harms, with plaintiffs.
217. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000).
218. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements
in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377, 1381 (2000).
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the suit and the lawyers' actions.219 Some information conveyed to
class members would likely have to be censored beyond what would
normally occur in a lawyer-client relationship, given that anything of
a sensitive nature would be easily obtainable by the opposing attor-
neys or the public at large. While the limits of this would need to be
considered more fully, conveying even basic information would be
helpful for engaging class members and providing greater trans-
parency in the process.
Second, because of lawyers' process expertise, they would assume
additional importance in helping the court to devise the appropriate
methods and levels of engagement for class members. They might
also serve as particularly adept facilitators for any discussions or fo-
rums that take place.220 Serving as neutral facilitator in an adver-
sarial proceeding may run against the grain of what most class
counsel do. However, lawyers are increasingly taking on facilitative
roles, and doing so for the class would help class counsel to advocate
on behalf of class members better. Moreover, even outside of a certi-
fied class action, lawyers could advise potential class claimants on
ways to resolve their problems, through the use of Internet and social
media to bring alleged malfeasors to the bargaining table.
3. Monitors and Catalysts
Internet-based processes raise another possibility for the resolu-
tion of large-scale disputes that depart more dramatically from tradi-
tional court-based processes. In this paradigm an ombuds-type entity
could exist to monitor complaints, disputes and other types of online
activity for patterns pointing to large-scale problems. This body could
identify the problem to the alleged malfeasor and give them the op-
tion to correct it or alternatively seek to disseminate information
about the pattern of harm to regulators and/or individuals who might
be affected. If simple dissemination of information did not produce
results, the body could seek to convene groups online to take action
together to address the alleged wrong. If that proved ineffective, the
entity could locate counsel to take the case through the formal litiga-
tion process. Such entities would provide monitoring services, helping
219. Cf Burch, supra note 106, at 36 (discussing experiments with providing
greater information to mass tort plaintiffs: "Such techniques provide plaintiffs with a
limited degree of transparency that is not generally available in mass cases. They
have the advantage of avoiding overreaching by some attorneys, as in the fen-phen
case.").
220. Cf Menkel-Meadow, supra note 185, at 364 (discussing a model of the lawyer
as consensus builder in deliberative democratic systems).
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to identify potential problems and catalysts for collective action,
where it can be created without involvement of the courts.
A system of monitoring may at first seem far-fetched, but re-
search is finding that social media is particularly suited to uncover-
ing potentially large-scale problems before they spread. One
interesting example of this is a study finding the Twitter is better at
predicting outbreaks of cholera in the developing world than any
other detection mechanism. 221 This is due to the fact that many indi-
viduals in developing countries have cell phones and will post tweets
about isolated incidents that, when viewed in the aggregate, bring
forward a pattern of outbreak than can provoke swift intervention.
For a model of how the courts might be used to incent and manage
such processes, it is instructive to look at the experience of Europe
using laws that take the court-as-catalysts approach.222 This ap-
proach connects with a body of theory that claims that the role of
courts as norm elaborators and norm enforcers should be supple-
mented with an understanding that courts have an important role as
catalysts for inquiry and remediation.223 Environmental regulation is
one area in which this approach has gained traction, where certain
regulations call for the creation of rules or the resolution of certain
disputes using processes designed to include the broadest possible
range of stakeholders. 224 The central idea of the court-as catalysts
approach is that the law mandates a convening process by which
stakeholders must be invited to negotiate a regulatory proposal about
which all have a material interest. The court does not prescribe a
process or manage the discussion, but provides a backstop of reme-
dies related to the process. For example, the resulting regulation or
decision can only be challenged if an element of the process was miss-
ing - for instance a key stakeholder was not invited or some fraud or
conflict of interest emerged to cause doubt that the result was con-
sensus driven. 225 Thus, all parties have an incentive to include as
many stakeholders as possible and design an inclusive system. Note
that inclusion in this context does not mean that every important
221. See Rumi Chunara, Jason R. Andrews & John S. Brownstein, Social and
News Media Enable Estimation of Epidemiological Patterns Early in the 2010 Haitian
Cholera Outbreak, 86 Ai. J. Taop. MED. HYG. 39 (2012); Connie St. Louis & Gozde
Zorlu, Can Twitter Predict Disease Outbreaks?, 344 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL (2012),
http://mbds.promedmail.org/documents/BMJTwitterMay20l2.pdf.
222. See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judi-
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stakeholder actually participated, but that each had the opportunity
to do so. In the context of aggregate litigation a similar process could
be used to encourage monitoring efforts for widespread harms, as
well as to induce inclusive settlement negotiations if those harms are
uncovered and determined to be actionable by the court.
A number of questions would have to be resolved about such a
system before it could be workable, and addressing them is beyond
the scope of this paper. For example, would this be too complicated
and drag proceedings out too long? Experience with privately estab-
lished claims commissions have not always found them faster than
traditional processes. Involving stakeholders to such a large degree
could become unwieldy, muddling grievances and limiting potential
resolutions.
Assuming these questions could be addressed, court-catalyzed
disputing processes could accommodate and account for parallel dis-
pute resolution efforts that arise organically on the Internet, and
they could provide for much faster resolution. Imagine, for example, a
situation in which potential stakeholders are notified and convened,
either in person or virtually. The putative defendant realizes the ex-
tent of dissatisfaction with its practices even absent any discussion of
the legal merits. It could choose to establish its own procedures for
correcting the action and compensating the attorneys and class mem-
bers who had been aggrieved. Or, it could proceed to a litigation pro-
cess to defend the action, but only after showing that alternative
processes are not warranted. 226
4. Problems of Participation
In any new system design, it is questionable that individuals
would know about the dispute resolution process or care enough to
226. Collateral attack usually indicates a lack of buy-in from the attacking plain-
tiff. See Burch, supra note 35. For a description of the collateral attack problem gener-
ally, see William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons from
Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 790, 820-41 (2007). See also Bone, Puzzling Idea, supra
note 75, at 625 ("The collateral attack problem is easy to state. In the typical situa-
tion, a class action settles and a discontented member of the class brings a separate
suit seeking to litigate the same claim. The defendant in the second suit argues claim
preclusion, but the plaintiff responds that she was not adequately represented in the
class action and therefore cannot constitutionally be bound. The issue is whether the
plaintiff should be allowed to litigate and avoid preclusion if he succeeds in convincing
the second judge that representation was inadequate in the first suit, even if the first
judge already determined it was adequate.").
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participate. Even where costs are low, class actions may seem re-
mote, esoteric, or irrelevant to many putative class members, espe-
cially where individual recoveries are small. Experiments with online
notice and comment mechanisms for regulatory action, for instance,
have so far met with mixed levels of interest. 2 2 7 Examples of online
"protests" in some consumer contexts provide evidence that at least
some groups of people feel strongly enough to participate in mass dis-
pute resolution. However, even when people participate, a vast ma-
jority of group members tend to remain silent, potentially skewing
the input in favor of the more vocal individuals.
Nonetheless, the opportunity to participate remains important to
maintain the legitimacy of the system. Where participation lags, ef-
forts aimed at improving it continue to be developed and meet with
increasing success. In other public engagement contexts, such as pub-
lic referenda and electoral participation, there is evidence that In-
ternet-based engagement efforts significantly increase levels of
voting and political organizing. 228 Web 2.0 technology provides prom-
ise in this respect, because it is easy to use. At an extreme, even data
mining and other passive forms of gauging group sentiment could be
employed to introduce class member concerns, if not their actual en-
gagement. Of course, using the web to enhance participation assumes
that individuals have access o it and know how to use it. While
greater numbers of people are gaining Web 2.0 access and savvy,
there would undoubtedly be many people left out of engagement ef-
forts. However, there would still be far fewer people left out of a Web
2.0 process than there would under existing procedures. As effective
approaches to engagement emerge and are refined, productive en-
gagement could be significantly increased.
V. CONCLUSION
Aggregate dispute resolution, historically an odd fit in the civil
justice system, has evolved to be very different from the traditional
model of litigation. Throughout that evolution, the core assumptions
227. See Farina et a., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less, supra note 196, at
453.
228. See Filipe R. Campante, Ruben Durante & Francesco Sobbrio, Politics 2.0:
The Multifaceted Effect of Broadband Internet on Political Participation (National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 19029, 2013), available at http://www.
nber.org/papers/w19029; see also Stephanie Young, OIRA Chief Sunstein: We Can Hu-
manize, Democratize Regulation, HARv. L. REc., Mar. 12, 2010, http://hlrecord.orgpp=
9714 (quoting Cass Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Address at
Harvard Law School: Humanizing Cost-Benefit Analysis (Mar. 1, 2010)).
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about the proper place of the collective plaintiffs relative to the defen-
dant, the lawyers, the judge, and the rest of society have become less
connected with underlying reality.
It is beyond doubt that the relation of individuals to the court,
the state, and to each other has changed in significant ways and in a
very short time due to advances in social networking technology and
changing practices of networking behavior. If an institutional process
is to maintain its legitimacy, it must remain connected to the societal
realities in which it exists. The class action is no different. To remain
relevant, adaption to account for these technologies is essential.
